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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Contracts-Priority of Successive Assignments by a
Common Assignor.
X Co. entered into a contract with a town for the construction of
a water and sewerage system. It assigned to its surety all payments
due and to become due from the town to secure the surety from loss
on performance bonds given by X Co. for this and other construction
projects. Later X Co. assigned the same monies to P to secure a loan.
Before making the loan and accepting the assignment P inquired of
the town and was told that there were no previous assignments. P gave
notice to the town of its assignment before any notice was given by
the surety. Later, P brings an action against the town for the money
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in its possession due X Co. The surety claims the money under the
terms of its assignment because of loss on a performance bond of X
Co. covering another construction job. Held, P is entitled to the
money.1
This case presents the question of which of successive assignees
from a common assignor is entitled to the proceeds of a claim embraced
by both assignments. Title to a chose in action derived through as-
signment was at first recognized only by courts of chancery.2 And even
when such a title is enforced in a court of law, it retains the incidents
resulting from its equitable origin.3 But either assignee, at least when
he takes without notice of rights in other persons and gives value,
will prevail over the other if he: (1) collects the money assigned, 4
(2) recovers judgment against the debtor on the assigned claim, 5 (3)
secures a contract whereby the debtor promises to pay him the money
covered by the assignment, 6 or (4) obtains possession of the writing
evidencing the obligation assigned if this writing be of a required type.7
'Bank of Northampton v. Jackson, 214 N. C. 582, 200 S. E. 444 (1939). The
decision seems to have been partly based upon the following grounds: (1) The
town became independently 'bound to pay the plaintiff without notice of prior
assignments. (2) Since the construction contract stipulated against assignments
without the consent of the town the assignment to the surety, being without this
consent, is invalid. But cf. Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N. Y. 277, 41 N. E. 572
(1895). (3) The court also seemed to suggest that the plaintiff was subrogated
to the rights of the town because the money loaned was used to aid the completion
of the construction project. Contra: Standard Oil Co. v. Powell Paving & Con-
tracting Co., 139 S. C. 411, 138 S. E. 184 (1927) ; see note (1934) 43 YALE L. J.
1135, 1143. But, as a whole, the opinion seemed to treat the case as involving
primarily the question of priority of successive assignments of a chose in action.
2 See Wallston v. Braswell, 54 N. C. 138, 139 (1853) ; Holdsworth, Choses in
Action by the Cotnmon Law (1920) 33 RALv. L. Rev. 997, 1021.
3 See 2 WiLLisToN. CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) 1297, 1298.
'Rabinowitz v. People's Nat. Bank, 235 Mass. 102, 126 N. E. 289 (1920).
But ef. Thigpen v. Horne, 36 N. C. 20 (1840). Contra: Superior Brassiere Co. v.
Zimetbaum, 214 App. Div. 525, 212 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1st Dep't 1925).5 Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How. 612, 15 L. ed. 231 (U. S. 1855) ; Mack Mfg. Co.
v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 114 S. C. 207, 103 S. E. 499 (1919).
8 Burck v. Taylor, 152 U. S. 634, 14 Sup. Ct. 696, 38 L. ed. 578 (1894) ; cf.
Bank of Dallas v. McCanless, 199 N. C. 360, 154 S. E. 621 (1930).
' Graham Paper Co. v. Pembroke, 124 Cal. 117, 56 Pac. 627 (1899) (book
accounts); Coffman v. Liggett's Adm'r, 107 Va. 418, 59 S. E. 392 (1907) (in-
surance policy). It would seem, on principle, that the writings which confer
"legal title" upon transfer, thereby allowing either assignee who is the transferee
to prevail, should be limited to negotiable instruments where the promise of the
debtor runs to the assignee; to specialties where the writing is, as well as repre-
sents, the contract, AmEs, CASES ON TRUSTS (2d ed. 1893) 328; or, at the most, to
other indispensable documents surrender of which is a condition precedent to the
debtor's obligation to pay, Glenn, Assignments of Choses in Action (1934) 20
VA. L. REv. 621, 627. Numerous other types of writings have been held to confer
a superior title on a subsequent assignee when he gains possession of them.
Security Mortgage Co. v. Delfs, 47 Cal. App. 599, 191 Pac. 53 (1920) (note and
mortgage) ; Bridge v. Wheeler, 152 Mass. 343, 25 N. E. 612 (1890) (life in-
surance policy); Washington Township v. First Nat. Bank of 'Huntington, 147
Mich. 571, -111 N. W. 349 (1907) (construction contract and municipal order);
Greeley County v. First Nat. Bank of Cozad, 126 Neb. 872, 254 N. W. 502 (1934)
(county's acknowledgment of claim against it); see Maybin v. Kirby, 4 Rich.
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In these situations the assignee, having acquired a legal right in good
faith and for value, takes free from the equities of other persons.8
But in the principal case, rneither assignee having become a bona
fide purchaser of a legal right, it. is necessary to determine whose
equities will prevail. The great bulk of the cases can be grouped into
two classes for purposes of this problem. First, there are cases which
give priority to the assignee who first procures his assignment.9 The
rationale for such a rule is that the first assignment conveys to the
first assignee all the rights of the assignor against the debtor to the
funds, leaving nothing a subsequent assignee can acquire except rights
in personam against his assignor.10  Secondly, there are cases which
prefer the assignee who first notifies the debtor or obligor of his as-
signment."' The rationale for this rule is that the assignment is in-
complete and imperfect, conveys no property interest at all, and is of
no force against the debtor or subsequent assignees until notice is
given to the debtor.12 But under either view, an assignee who would
otherwise prevail may lose his priority because of conduct which gives
rise to an estoppel.' 3  In a comparatively recent decision' 4 of the
Supreme Court of the United States the possibility of a third and
compromise rule was suggested. This view,' 5 although taking the
Eq. Cas. 105, 114 (S. C. 1851) (stock script). But since the basis for so holding
is that the prior assignee is negligent in leaving such writings in the possession
of the assignor thereby inducing subsequent assignees to rely on the assignor's
apparent ownership, the possession of such writing by a prior assignee should not,
in itself, make his title superior to that of a subsequent assignee.8 AmEs, CAsEs ON TRUSTS (2d ed. 1893) 328; 2 WiLLisroN, CONTRACTS 1261.
White v. Wiley, 14 Ind. 495 (1860) ; Talbot v. Cook, 23 Ky. 438 (1828) ;
Putnam v. Story, 132 Mass. 205 (1882) ; Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N. Y. 277, 41
N. E. 572 (1895); Forsythe v. Fisher, 20 W. Va. 497 (1882); 2 WLisToN,
CoNrTAcrs §435.
1" See Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturer's Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 192, 44
Sup. Ct. 266, 268, 68 L. ed. 628, 632 (1923) ; Columbia Finance Co. v. First Nat.
Bank, 116 Ky. 364, 375, 76 S. W. 156, 158 (1903).
"I Graham Paper Co. v. Pembroke, 124 Cal. 117, 56 Pac. 627 (1899) ; Lambert
v. Morgan, 110 Md. 1, 72 AtL. 407 (1909); Murdock v. Finney, 21 Mo. 138(1855); Philip's Estate, 205 Pa. 515, 55 AUt. 213 (1903); Clodfelter v. Cox, 1
Snee.d 330 (Tenn. 1853) ; 2 WumsTo. , CONRACTS §435.
12 See cases cited supra note 11. Because this rationale seems to beg the
question, the following cases suggest additional reasons that are often given.
Philip's Estate, 205 Pa. 515, 55 AtL 213 (1903) (notice prevents fraud on sub-
sequent assignees by the creditor) ; Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1 (Ch. 1823) (failure
to give notice clothes the assignor with "apparent possession"). It would seem
that these reasons serve to support the third rule.
"'Commercial Investment Trust Co. v. Bay City Bank, 62 F. (2d) 735 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1933) ; Herman v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 218 Mass. 181, 105
N. E. 450 (1914) ; see cases cited supra note 7.
1" Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturer's Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 44 Sup.
Ct. 266, 68 L. ed. 628 (1923), following the dissenting opinion in 280 Fed. 803,
806 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922). The Supreme Court in this case definitely rejected the
second rule. Whether it adopted the first or the third rule is a matter of speculation.
11 Cf. Houser v. Richardson, 90 Mo. App. 134 (1901); Moorestown Trust
Co. v. Buzby, 109 N. J. Eq. 409, 157 AtL. 663 (1931) ; see In re Gillespie, 15 Fed.
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position that the rights against the debtor are vested in the assignee
at the time of the assignment contract rather than at the time of notice
to the debtor, makes failure' 6 to notify the debtor negligence on the
part of the assignee, and, when the subsequent assignee takes only
after inquiry of the debtor as to previous assignments, estops the prior
assignee to contest the validity of the later assignment. Although the
cases applying the first rule recognize the possibility of an estoppel,1 7
it is implicit in these cases that failure to give notice is not such con-
duct as will give rise to one ;18 and the cases adopting the second rule
go too far to allow their results to be explained on estoppel alone.19
Of'the three tests for deciding priority, the first seems to be pref-
erable. It has the advantage of being simple to understand and to
apply. However, it is undesirable in that an assignee is always subject
to losing his rights to prior assignees, there being no way he can as-
suredly discover the existence of such persons. Because of this risk
the assignee is apt to be unwilling to pay much for the claim, the
creditor is therefore less willing to sell, and commerce suffers because
contract rights are less marketable. But this objection can be alle-
viated in part if the parties to the contract giving rise to the claim
create that type20 of written evidence of the obligation which, upon
transfer, will enable the assignee to acquire a "legal right" and con-
sequently be free from undisclosed equities in third persons.
The second rule has the advantage of instilling a greater feeling of
security in the assignee. Its requirement of notice is one that a prudent
man would ordinarily observe in order to prevent the debtor from set-
tling with-the creditor-assignor.21 But it has the disadvantage of unduly
penalizing the assignee for failing to give notice to the debtor. Even
assuming that failure on the part of the prior assignee to give notice
to the debtor is negligence toward the interests of subsequent assignees,
it seems unduly harsi to allow them to take advantage of this negli-
734, 736 (S. D. N. Y. 1883); Wilson v. Duncan, 61 F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 5th,
1932).; Bishop v. Holcomb, 10 Conn. 444, 446 (1835); Board of Education v.
Zinc, 101 N. J. Eq. 78, 83, 137 Atl. 713, 715 (1927) ; note (1924) 24 COL. L. Rv.
501, 507.
1" Being based on negligence, the application of this rule would probably allow
a prior assignee to prevail even when a subsequent assignee both made inquiry
and gave prior notice, provided the prior assignee did not, under the circumstances,
delay an unreasonable time in giving his notice. Cf. Feltham v. Clarke, 1 De
G. & S. 307 (Ch. 1847) ; see Bishop v. Holcomb, 10 Conn. 444, 446 (1835) (prior
assignee must give notice within a reasonable time) ; note (1924) 24 COL. L. Rv.
501, 508. 1" See cases cited supra note 13.
18 See BOGERT, TRUSTS A') TRusTEs (1935) 557.
19 That is, the rule does not take into account the element of inquiry by sub-
sequent assignees. Meux v. Bell, 1 Hare 73 (Ch. 1841).
° See note 7, -upra.2 See King v. Lindsay, 38 N. C. 77, 80 (1843).
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gence when they are not injured by it-i.e., when they fail to inquire
of the debtor before securing their assignments. Conversely, when no
notice has been given by the prior assignee at the time the subsequent
assignee gives value on the strength of this appearance, it seems unjust
to subordinate his claim to that of the 15rior assignee merely because,
subsequently, the latter was the first to give notice of his assignment.
Prior assignees could not possibly be injured by the failure of a sub-
sequent assignee to notify the debtor. That these arguments are given
some force by the court is seen in the decisions holding that a prior
assignee will prevail over a subsequent garnishing creditor even though
the former did not give notice until after the garnishment,22 and that
a prior assignee who failed to give notice will prevail over a subsequent
assignee who did, if the former gave value and the latter did not.
23
The third rule, although inferior to the second in that it introduces
the additional factor of inquiry,24 seems, as a whole, preferable to the
second rule in that it avoids the defect of conferring an undeserved
windfall. But both have serious objections arising from the necessity
for giving notice which make them less desirable than the first. What
is notice and how must it be given? Can it be constructive, or must
it be actual? Does the debtor have to acquire knowledge, or will an
attempt on the part of the assignee to confer knowledge be sufficient ?25
If so, what kind of an attempt ?26 If the debtor has to acquire knowl-
edge does the assignee have to be the cause of such receipt, or can it be
acquired casually or accidentally ?27 When must such notice be given?
Can it be given to the debtor before he becomes obligated on the assigned
claim, or must it be given afterwards ?28 Does it have to be given after
the assignment is completed, or can the notice be given prospective to
the assignment? Difficulties such as these in the application of a rule22 Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 172 N. C. 354, 90 S. E. 312
(1916).
"The Elmbank, 72 Fed. 610 (N. D. Cal. 1896).
2 It is. a legitimate, if not a necessary, inference that a duty to give notice pre-
supposes a duty on subsequent purchasers to make inquiry. See Salem Trust Co.
v. Manufacturer's Finance Co., 280 Fed. 803, 814 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922) (dissenting
opinion) ; King v. Lindsay, 38 N. C. 77, 80 (1843). If this duty to inquire exist,
then the rule that a subsequent assignee who acquires a "legal right" will prevail
must be conditioned upon the later purchaser making inquiry, provided notice
was given by the earlier assignee. The duty to inquire charging him with knowl-
edge of all that such inquiry would have revealed, the subsequent assignee would
not be a purchaser without notice.
" In re Leterman, Becher & Co., 260 Fed. 543 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919) (debtor
must receive knowledge); Felthamn v. Clarke, 1 De G. & S. 307 (Ch. 1847)
debtor need not receive knowledge in all cases).
-? Feltham v. Clarke, 1 De G. & S. 307 (Ch. 1847) "assignee must do all in
his power toward. giving notice).
27 Barron v. Porter, 44 Vt. 587 (1872) (debtor must receive knowledge through
the pr9curement of the assignee).
28 Somerset v. Cox, 33 Beav. 634 (Rolls Ct. 1865) (must be given after the
obligation is incurred).
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requiring notice can be multiplied.2 9 This requirement of notice prac-
tically destroys the concept of assignability. Even without this concept
a third party can succeed to the rights of an obligee by novation. If
assignability is conditioned upon notice its recognition in the law is of
scant utility. For it is but little more trouble, and much safer, 0 to
effect a novation than it is to give notice.
The North Carolina cases before the principal case did little to
clarify the rule governing assignments in this state. Probably the most
direct authority on the.point is Thigpen v. Home,81 which applies the
first rule. In that case a prior assignee was preferred over a subsequent
assignee even though the latter had collected 3 2 the proceeds of the
assigned claim. Although the court said nothing about notice to the
debtor being given by either assignee, it must have been thought irrel-
evant, for the opinion was written as a guide for the court below at a
new trial. The problem involved in the case of Lindsay v. Wilson"8
which, because of its language, is also cited as authority for the first rule
is distinguishable from the problem before us in that the second assign-
ment, by its terms, was made subject to the prior one, and the subse-
quent assignee had notice of the prior assignment. Richmond County v.
Page Trust Co.,34 where the court preferred a prior assignee without
discussion of notice to the debtor, is distinguishable in that the decision
was on a ruling to a demurrer and the prior assignee alleged the second
assignment was fraudulent. The case of Wallston v. Braswell," which
seems to adopt the second rule, is distinguishable in that the assignment
was of a legacy and the second assignee, who prevailed over an earlier
one who failed to give notice, was the executor. The so-called assignment
being to the executor in his official capacity, this case comes within the
= See WHim & TUDOR, LEADING CASES IN EQUIrY (4th Amer. ed. 1877) 1584
et seq.; Firth, The Rule in. Dearie v. Hall (1895) 11 L. Q. REv. 337; note 66
L. R. A. 760, 770 (1905).
"0 There is the risk that the notice given may not be sufficient in the case of
an assignment.
3136 N. C. 20 (1840). As far as the bare holding is concerned the case might
be reconciled with all three rules. It may be said that under all three rules
notice is irrelevant when neither assignee gives "value". Under the first rule
notice is never relevant. Under the second rule it has been held that the prior
assignee prevails even when he gives notice last if neither assignee gave value.
Sloper v. Cottrell, 6 E. & B. 497 (Q. B. 1856). Under the third rule the negligent
failure of a prior assignee to give notice can no more injure a subsequent assignee
who fails to give value than one who fails to make inquiry. In this North Car-
olina case the consideration for each assignment was a pre-existing debt.
32 It is stated that the fact that neither assignee gave value does not prevent
the assignee who acquires "legal title" from prvailing. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,
§435. Even though one disagree with the decision because of the fact that the
subsequent assignee collected the proceeds, in reaching the result that it did the
major premise of the court was that the prior assignee would be entitled to the
proceeds if they were in the hands of the debtor, and that is the point in which we
are interested. s 22 N. C. 85 (1838).
a' 195 N. C. 545, 142 S. E. 786 (1928).
3054 N. C. 137 (1853).
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rule3" ' which protects an obligor, here the executor, who without notice
of an assignment enters into a contract with his obligee, the assignor
here, whereby the terms of the original agreement are altered. Treating
the agreement with the executor as an assignment to him, as the court
did, the case is also authority for the third rule. The assignee being the
obligor, the equivalent of inquiry was naturally present. Language can
be found in other cases tending to support both the first and second
rules .
3 7
The principal case, also, so far as it attempts to determine the
priority of successive assignments alone, does little to state which rule
is law in North Carolina. Although the opinion would reject the first
rule, it is still authority for either the second or the third rules. While
the prior assignee lost because he was last to give notice, the subsequent
assignee, before taking the assignment, had made inquiry, and it can
be said that the former lost because he negligently injured the later
assignee. Another factor in the case which, although not discussed by
the court, seems important is that both of the assignments were for
the purposes of security. Such being the case, they should have been
governed by the recordation statute3 8 applicable to mortgages of per-
sonal property.
WILLIAM R. DALTON, JR.
Federal Courts-Jurisdictional Amount in Cases of Injunction
against Enforcement of Licensing Acts.
Plaintiff, a photographer, sued in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia to enjoin the enforcement of a
Georgia statute requiring the licensing of photographers. The amount
of the license fee then due was less than $3,000, but the plaintiff sought
to establish jurisdictional amount by a showing that the total volume of
his business in the state was in excess of $5,000. It was held that the
court was without jurisdiction, the business not being impaired to the
extent of $3,000. The amount of the fee and the nature of the penalty
for noncompliance- were not specified.1
The district courts have original jurisdiction of suits at law or in
equity when such suits arise under the United States Constitution, laws
" Assignees take subject to defenses between the original parties, obligor and
obligee, arising before notice of the assignment to the obligor. North Carolina
Bank & Trust Co. v. Williams, 201 N. C. 464, 160 S.E. 484 (1931)
37 See Perry v. Merchants Bank of New Bern, 70 N. C. 309, 315 (1874) (first
rule) ; Motz v. Stowe, 83 N. C. 434, 439 (1880) (second rule) ; Blue Pearl Granite
Co. v. Merchants Bank, 172 N. C. 354, 359, 90 S. E. 312, 314 (1916).
'
8 N.C.CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3311; Sneeden v. Nurnburger's Market,
192 N. C. 439, 135 S. E. 328 (1926) ; Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 202 N. C.
604, 163 S. E. 676 (1932).
'Connor v. Rivers, 25 F. Supp. 937 (N. D. Ga. 1938).
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or treaties, or when there is diversity of citizenship, only if the amount
in controversy, that is, the value of the matter in controversy, is in
excess of $3,000.2 This value is measured by the "plaintiff viewpoint"
rule, or the value to the plaintiff of the object of the suit.3 In actions
for damages there is usually little difficulty in determining jurisdictional
amount, for it is the amount of damages claimed in good faith by the
plaintiff.4 But when an injunction is sought, the problem is less def-
inite. Particularly is this so in cases of injunction against the enforce-
ment of licensing and regulatory legislation.
When a property tax is sought to be enjoined, most courts hold that
the amount in controversy is the amount of the tax accrued at the time
the .action was commenced. 5 When, however, the tax is a license or
privilege tax, the rules governing the determination of the amount in
controversy are not nearly so well settled. The courts are unable to
agree in these cases upon a single concept of what constitutes the object
of suit or the matter in controversy. It has been suggested that in this
situation there are really two matters in controversy: a primary matter
being the right to be free of the particular burden imposed by the reg-
ulatory or taxing statute, and a secondary matter being the right to
conduct business without any unlawful interference. Some courts
designate the value of the primary matter as the amount in controversy;
others designate the value of the secondary matter.6
Those cases which adopt the value of the secondary matter in con-
2 REv. STAT. §§563, 639 (1875) as amended, 18 STAT. 470 (1875), 24 STAT.
552 (1887), 25 STAT. 433 (1888), 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 48 STAT. 775 (1934),
50 STAT. 738 (1937), 28 U. S. C. A. §41(1) (Supp. 1938).
' Glenwood Light Co. v. Mutual Light Co., 239 U. S. 121, 36 Sup. Ct. 30,
60 L. ed. 174 (1915) ; First Nat. Bank of Columbia v. Louisiana Highway Comm.
264 U. S. 308, 44 Sup. Ct. 340, 68 L. ed. 701 (1924) ; Chicago Board of Trade
v. Celia Commission Co., 145 Fed. 28 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906); Bricklayers', Masons',
and Plasterers' International Union v. Bowen, 278 Fed. 271 (S. D. Tex. 1922) ;
Adam v. New York Trust Co., 37 F. (2d) 826 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) ; Swan
Island Club v. Ansell, 51 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); DOME, FEDERAL
PROCEDURE (1928) §56.
'Smithers v. Smith, 204 U. S. 632, 27 Sup. Ct. 297, 51 L. ed. 656 (1906);
Hampton Stove Co. v. Gardner, 154 Fed. 805 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907); 0. J. Lewis
Mercantile Co. v. Klepner, 176 Fed. 343 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910); Mullins Lumber
Co. v. Williamson & Brown Land & Lumber Co., 246 Fed. 232 (C. C. A. 4th,
1917); Ragsdale v. Rudich, 293 Fed. 182 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923); note (1934)
34 COL. L. REv. 311.
'Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U. S. 68, 20 Sup. Ct. 272, 44 L ed. 272
(1900); Eachus v. Hartwell, 112 Fed. 564 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1901); Purnell
v. Page, 128 Fed. 496 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1903); Turner v. Jackson Lumber Co.,
159 Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 5th, 1908); Bank of Arizona v. Howe, 293 Fed. 600
(D. Ariz. 1923). This situation should not be confused with that in which per-
manent contractual immunity from taxation is claimed, the amount in controversy
in the latter situation beiiig the value of the exemption during the life of the
corporation, and not merely accrued taxes. Berryman v. Whitman College,
222 U. S. 334, 32 Sup. Ct. 149, 56 L. ed. 225 (1912).Note (1936) 25 CALiF. L. REv. 336.
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troversy as the test of jurisdictional amount7 are in conflict as to whether
to take the value of (a) the right to do business at all or (b) the extent
of the injury to the business resulting from the application of the
statute. One group of cases, reasoning that a regulation or license
tax is imposed on the right to do business, hold that that right itself is
disputed and therefore the amount in controversy is the value of the
business.8 This view seems sound as applied to cases in which the tax
imposed is prohibitive,9 for in such a case the right to do business is
directly controverted by the tax itself. But the courts have applied the
same test in cases where the penalty, and not the tax, would force the
plaintiff out of business.' 0  In such a situation, this test seems inap-
propriate, because if payment of the tax were made, no penalty would
be inflicted and the plaintiff could continue to operate his business.
Unless the tax itself is so exorbitant as to destroy the business, the fact
that the penalties for non-payment would have this effect does not seem
to justify considering the value of the business as the amount in con-
troversy. In other words, the courts should look to the effect of pay-
ment of the tax rather than of non-payment. For, unless payment will
destroy the business, the right to do business is not actually disputed,
and its value should not be considered the amount in controversy.
Another group of cases, while still employing the "secondary matter"
test, take the view that the matter in controversy is the right to be
free of the impairment resulting from the application of the statute, and
that the amount in controversy is the amount of the injury occasioned
" Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257, 68 L. ed. 596 (1924);
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U. S. 178, 56 Sup. Ct. 780,
80 L. ed. 1135 (1936); American Fertilizing Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 43
Fed. 609 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1890); Humes v. Little Rock, 138 Fed. 929 (C. C.
W. D. Ark. 1898); Southern Express Co. v. Mayor of Ensley, 116 Fed. 756 (C. C.
N. D. Ala. 1902); Nutt v. Ellerbe, 56 F. (2d) 1058 (E. D. S. C. 1932) ; Grandin
Farmers' Co-op. Elevator Co. v. Langer, 5 F. Supp. 425 (D. N. D. 1934), aff'd,
292 U. S. 605, 54 Sup. Ct. 772, 78 L. ed. 1461 (1934); White Cleaners &
Dyers v. Hughes, 7 F. Supp. 1017 (W. D. La. 1934).
' Humes v. Little Rock, 138 Fed. 929 (C. C. W. D. Ark. 1898) ; Southern Ex-
press Co. v. Mayor of Ensley, 116 Fed. 756 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1902) ; Hutchinson
v. Beckham, 118 Fed. 399 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902); Campbell Baking Co. v. Maryville,
31 F. (2d) 466 (W. D. Mo. 1929); McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 58 F. (2d)
994 (S. D. W. Va. 1931); Nutt v. Ellerbe, 56 F. (2d) 1058 (E. D. S. C. 1932);
Grandin Farmers' Co-op. Elevator Co. v. Langer, 5 F. Supp. 425 (D. N. D.
1934), aff'd, 292 U. S. 605, 54 Sup. Ct. 772, 78 L. ed. 1461 (1934); White
Cleaners & Dyers v. Hughes, 7 F. Supp. 1017 (W. D. La. 1934).
' Humes v. Little Rock, 138 Fed. 929 (C. C. W. D. Ark. 1898); Campbell Bak-
ing Co. v. Maryville, 31 F. (2d) 466 (W. D. Mo. 1929); Grandin Farmers' Co-op.
Elevator Co. v. Langer, 5 F. Supp. 425 (D. N. D. 1934), aff'd, 292 U. S.
605, 54 Sup. Ct. 772, 78 L. ed. 1461 (1934).
10 Southern Express Co. v. Mayor of Ensley, 116 Fed. 756 (C. C. N. D. Ala.
1902); Hutchinson v. Beckham, 118 Fed. 399 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902); St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. v. Emmerson, 30 F. (2d) 322 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929), rev'd
on other grounds, 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8, 75 L. ed. 135 (1930); Nutt v.
Ellerbe, 56 F. (2d) 1058 (E. D. S. C. 1932).
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by enforcement of the statute." Under this rule the value of the busi-
ness is not the test in all cases, but only in those in which the extent
of the impairment is equal to the whole value of the business. In this
respect it is sounder than the rule making the value of the business the
absolute test, for in many cases, only impairment, and not complete
destruction will result from enforcement of the statute. However, the
same inappropriateness found in that test is also apparent here. Look-
ing to the effect of non-payment rather than of payment, some courts
have held that the injury caused by penalties should also be counted in
determining the amount in controversy, although payment of the tax
would preclude the possibility of impairment due to penalties.12 Other
cases, however, have held that only impairment resulting from payment
6f the tax is to be considered.13 If the injury due to penalties is consid-
ered, the test in most cases would become the value of the business, as
the penalty for non-payment usually includes suppression of the busi-
ness, so that the right to do business would be controverted, and its
value would become the amount in controversy. Consequently, the ex-
tent of the injury test would -have no application were the effect of non-
payment rather than of payment deemed controlling. Under almost all
of these cases, capitalization'4 of the amount of the tax for the period
within which the injury is threatened is allowed as a part of the extent
of the injury, on the theory that the taxing statute will remain on the
books and that the plaintiff will continue to be liable therefor.15
The confusion experienced by the courts in.the application of the
"secondary matter" test has been partly responsible 
-for the adoption,
especially in more recent cases, of the "primary matter" test, which
" Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257, 68 L. ed. 596 (1924) ;
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U. S. 178, 54 Sup. Ct. 780,
80 L. ed. 1135 (1936); American Fertilizing Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 43
Fed. 609 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1890); Jewel Tea Co. v. Lee's Summit, 198 Fed.
532 (W. D. Mo. 1912) ; Station WBT v. Poulnot, 46 F. (2d) 671 (E. D. S. C.
1931) (This case is peculiar in that the tax was miot levied on the plaintiff,
but on the owners of radio receiving sets.)
"
2American Fertilizer Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 43 Fed. 609 (C. C. E. D.
N. C. 1890); Jewel Tea Co. v. Lee's Summit, 198 Fed. 532 (W. D. Mo. 1912).
" Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257, 68 L. ed. 596 (1924) ;
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U. S. 178, 56 Sup. Ct. 780,
80 L. ed. 1135 (1936); Station WBT v. Poulnot, 46 F. (2d) 671 (E. D. S. C.
1931).
" By "capitalization" is meant the reduction of a series of periodic pay-
ments to a single lump sum. Brown v. Erie R.R., 87 N. J. L. 487, 91 At. 1023(1914).
" American Fertilizer Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 43 Fed. 609 (C, C. E. D.
N. C. 1890); Station WBT v. PQulnot, 46 F. (2d) 671 (E. D. S. C. 1931)(capitalization of the amount of the impairment and not of the tax, as the tax
was not levied on the plaintiff). When the tax is to be paid only once, and not
annually, the amount -of the tax is the amount in controversy. Woodman v.
Ely, 2 Fed. 839 (C. C. W. D. Mich. 1880); Douglas Co. v. Stone, 110 Fed.
810 (C. C. W. D. Va. 1901), aff'd, 191 U. S. 557, 24 Sup. Ct. 843, 48 L. ed. 301(1903); Eachus v. Hartwell, 112 Fed. 564 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1901).
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brings the license tax cases more in line with the property tax cases.
As the primary matter is the right to be free of the particular burden
of tax imposed by the statute, the amount in dontroversy is the amount
of the tax only,16 and not its capitalized value, 17 or the amount of pos-
sible penalties which payment would'avoid.18 As this rule might work
hardship in some cases, two opportunities for adjustment were left
open in the leading case of Healy v. Ratta.19  It was suggested that in
cases where the tax itself was prohibitive, the right to do business should
be considered the matter in controversy.20 This exception seems wise,
for in such a case, the "primary matter" test appears too narrow to
meet the situation adequately. But -it may serve to pave the way for
attempts to apply a test similar to the "secondary matter" test in doubt-
ful cases. 21 And this may create more confusion in the decisions. It
was also suggested that penalties might be considered as part of the
matter in controversy when they had already accrued so that the plain-
tiff was liable therefor when the action was brought.22 As a practical
matter, this exception seems inadvisable, as it may encourage plaintiffs
deliberately to refrain from compliance with the statute until the pen-
alties amounted to $3,000 in order to test the validity of the statute in
the federal rather than the state court. However, it is true that when
the penalties have accrued, the object of one suit is as much to restrain
their enforcement as to restrain collection of the tax.
In license tax cases, the courts will not allow several plaintiffs, all
of whom are affected by the tax, to pool the amounts owed by each in
order to total the jurisdictional minimum. Pooling of the claims of
separate plaintiffs is permissible only when they join to enforce a single
right in which they have a common or undivided interest.2 3  In license
tax cases, the plaintiffs are in no way jointly liable for the amount of
'
8 Washington & Georgetown RIR. v. District of Columbia, 146 U. S. 227,
13 Sup. Ct. 64, 36 L. ed. 951 (1892) ; Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263, 54 Sup. Ct.
700,'78 L. ed. 1246 (1934); Grosjean v. Musser, 74 F. (2d.) 741 (C. C. A. 5th,
1935) ; Lucas v. Charlotte, 86 F. (2d) 394 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) ; Royalty Service
Corp. v. Los Angeles, 98 F. (2d) 551 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).; Crater Lake Nat.
Park Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm., 23 F. Supp. 316 (D. Ore. 1938).
'
7 Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263, 54 Sup. Ct. 700, 78 L. ed. 1246 (1934);
Grosjean v. Musser, 74 F. (2d) 741 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
"
8Healy v..Ratta, 292 U. S. 263, 54 Sup. Ct. 700, 78 L. ed. 1246 (1934);
Royalty Service Corp. v. Los Angeles, 98 F. (2d) 551 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
" 292 U. S. 263, 54 Sup. Ct. 700, 78 L. ed. 1246 (1934).
"
0See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S.'263, 269, 54 Sup. Ct. 700, 703, 78 L. ed.
1246, 1253 (1934).2 Dugan v. Bridges, 16 F. Supp. 994 (D. N. H. 1936).
2See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263, 267, 54 Sup. Ct. 700, 702, 78 L. ed.
1246, 1250 (1934).23Troy Bank v. Whitehead Co., 222 U. S. 39, 39. Sup. Ct. 9, 56 L. ed. 81
(1911) ; see Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77, 86, 43 Sup. Ct.
480, 483, 67 L. ed. 871, 874 (1923); Blume, Jurisdictional Amount in Repre-
sentative Suits (1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 501.
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the tax; therefore, when the claim of none amounts to $3,000, the fed-
eral court has no jurisdiction. 24
When the effect of payment rather than non-payment is considered,
the "secondary matter" test may become almost the same as the "pri-
mary matter" test. If the tax is prohibitive, the case will fall into the
first exception of Healy v. Ratta, so that under both tests the value of
the business is the amount in controversy.25 If the tax is not prohib-
itive, the value of the business should not be deemed the amount in
controversy,2 (6 and the extent of the injury in most cases will be only the
amount of the tax. However, there may be incidental results of pay-
ment which would be considered as part of the extent of the injury
under the "secondary matter" test,27 but which are not considered under
the "primary matter" test; and future taxes are allowed under the
former test but not under the latter.2 8  On the whole, the adoption of
the "primary matter" test would seem advisable, as its application is not
attended by so much confusion as is that of the "secondary matter"
test. Also, it represents an effort on the part of the federal court to
cut down the increasing volume of litigation with which they are btir-
dened and to avoid encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the state courts,
especially when the validity of state statutes, municipal ordinances, or
orders of state administrative boards is involved.20
The court in the principal case did not discuss the reasons for its
holding, merely remarking that the business was not impaired to the
extent of $3,000. This seems to indicate that the extent of the injury
was used as the test of jurisdictional amount. It is suggested that un-
less there was a showing of impairment incident to payment of the
fee other than the amount thereof, the amount of the tax alone would
have been a sounder basis for determining jurisdiction.
ELIZABETH SHEWMAKE.
"Dewar v. Brooks, 16 F. Supp. 636 (D. Nev. 1936); Dugan v. Bridges,
16 F. Supp. 694 (D. N. H. 1936); Buck v. Case, 24 F. Supp. 541 (W. D. Wash.
1938).
" Humes v. Little Rock, 138 Fed. 929 (C. C. W. D. Ark. 1898); Campbell
Baking Co. v. Maryville, 31 F. (2d) 466 (W. D. Mo. 1929) ; see Healy v. Ratta,
292 U. S. 263, 269, 54 Sup. Ct. 700, 703, 78-L. ed. 1246, 1250 (1934).
" See note 13, supra.
"Packard v. Banton, 264 -U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257, 68 L. ed. 596 (1924)
(where the court considered the alleged decreased earning power of trucks due
to payment); Station WBT v. Poulnot, 46 F. (2d) 671 (E. D. S. C. 1931) (where
the result of the tax would be to decrease the plaintiff's income from advertisers).
"Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263, 54 Sup. Ct. 700, 78 L. ed. 1246 (1934);
American Fertilizing Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 43 Fed. 609 (C. C. E. D. N. C.
1890). 1
2 See 'Healy v. Ratta, "292 U. S. 263, 270, 54 Sup. Ct. 700, 703' 78 L. ed.
1246, 1254 (1934) ; Lucas v. Charlotte, 86 F. '(2d) 394, 396 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Insurance-Master and Servant-Construction of Term
"Employee" As Used in Robbery and Burglary Policies.
The operator of a window cleaning company contracted with P to
furnish janitor service to P's jewelery store. His workman was in-
structed to do any other general work which P might request of him,
but P had no right to direct or control him. The D company insured
P's store against robbery, and the policy required the presence of a
custodian and at least one other employee at the time of the robbery.
When the robbery occurred a regular clerk in P's employ and the
janitor were in the store. In P's action to recover from D on the
policy the court held that the janitor was an "employee" of P within
the meaning of the insurance policy.'
Situations frequently arise where the owner of premises or a business
secures another to perform services for him and this contractee has the
labor done by one of its workmen. Whether the laborer then becomes
an employee of the owner is a question which arises not only in con-
struing the term as used in insurance contracts, but also in determining
liability at common law, under the Federal Employer's Liability Act,
and state workmen's compensation acts.
The relationship of employer and employee arises out of a contract,
express or implied, made by the parties or their agents. 2 If the em-
ployer undertakes by the contract to furnish the premises upon which
the work is to be done, tools and appliances, or fellow workers he is
under a duty to see that the premises and appliances are safe and that
the fellow servants are competent. 3  Consequently, in order to impose
liability upon the owner it is commonly necessary for an injured worker
to show an employer-employee relationship and thereby establish a.duty
to himself which the owner does not owe the general public. If the
party with whom the owner bargained is considered an independent
contractor the worker is deemed his employee and not that of the
owner.4 But to ascertain whether this second party is an independent
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Marylafrd v. S. Friedlander, 101 F.(2d) 106 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1938).
,See Benway- v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry., 26 F.(2d) 383, 385 (N. D.
Okla. 1928); Copp v. Paradis, 130 Me. 464, 467, 157 AtL. 228, 229 (1931);
Hodge v. Feiner, 338 Mo. 268, 271, 78 S. W. (2d) 478, 479 (1935); Meo v.
Bloomgarden, 237 App. Div. 325, 327, 261 N. Y. Supp. 279, 280. (24 Dep't 1933) ;
Holleman v. Taylor, 200 N. C. 618, 620, 158 S. E. 88, 89 (1931); Corbin v.
George, 308 Pa. 201, 203, 162 Atl. 459, 462 (1932).
Decatur v. Charles H. Tomkins Co., 25 F.(2d) 526 (App. D. C. 1928);
McGee v. C. E. De Brauwere & Co., 117 Fla. 859, 162 So. 510 (1925); Bell v.
Brown, 214 Iowa 370, 239 N. W. 785 (1932); Kelso v. Ross Const. Co., 337
Mo. 202, 85 S. W. (2d) 527 (1935); Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123
Tex. 128, 70 S. W. (2d) 397 (1934); 3 LABATr, MASTER & SERVANT (2d ed.
1913) §898.
" Cory Bros. & Co. v. United States, 51 F.(2d) 1010 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931);
Presto-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel, 182 Ind. 593, 106 N. E. 365 (1914); Gayle v. Mis-
souri Car & Foundry Co., 177 Mo. 427, 76 S. W. 987 (1903) ; Reisman v. Public
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contractor or merely an agent it is necessary to consider the relation-
ship between the owner and the workman. The most conclusive factor
is control over the worker. If the owner reserves only limited control
over the job he is ordinarily not considered the employer.0 Conversely,
a great deal of regulation so that the workman seems to be doing the
owner's business indicates that he is the latter's employee.0 The courts
have also given varying degrees of weight to considerations of whether
the owner pays for the work in a lump sum,7 whether he provided the
instruments used,8 and whether the type of work done ordinarily would
not require independence of performance. 9 Affirmative answers to
these tests generally cause the courts to treat the worker as the em-
ployee of the owner and the second party to the contract as merely the
latter's agent.
The term "employee" as used in the Federal Employers' Liability
Act has been construed by the United States Supreme Court to have
the same meaning as when used at common law.10 Pursuant to this
interpretation no liability as an employer attaches to a railroad in favor
of workers on Pullman" and express 12 cars where those cars are
operated by special contract with the railroad and the workers are not
under its control. But where the contract is one of co-proprietorsbip
Serv. Corp., 82 N. J:L. 464, 81 Atl. 838 (1911). MECHEm, OUT iNES oF AGENcY
(1923) §506.
'Casement v. Brown, 148,U. S. 615, 13 Sup. Ct. 672, 37 L. ed. 582 (1892);
Bellatty v. Barrett Mfg. Co., 196 Fed. 493 (C. C. A. 16t, 1912); Harrell v.
Atlas Portland Cement Co., 250 Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918); Scoggins v.
Atlantic & Gulf Portland Cement Co., 179 Ala. 213, 60 So. 175 (1912) ; Lafferty
v. United States Gypsum Co., 83 Kan. 349, 111 Pac. 498 (1910); Mason & Hoge
Co. v. Highland, 116 S. W. 320 (Ky. 1909) .
' Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Keinison, 42 Ariz. 349, 26 P.(2d)
113 (1933); McCormick Lumber Co. v. O'Brien, 90 Cal. App. 776, 266 Pac.
594 (1928) ; Burns v. Fitz, 33 Ohio App. 306, 169 N. E. 309 (1930); Gulf Re-
fining Co. v. Rogers, 57 S. W. (2d) 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); see North
Carolina Lumber Co. v. Spear Motor Co., 192 N. C. 377, 380, 135 S. E. 115,
117 (1926).1Kisner v. Jackson, 159 Miss. 424, 132 So. 90 (1931) ; Merron v. Fessenden
& Lowell, 77 N. H. 77, 87 At. 248 (1913) ; see North Carolina Lumber Co. v.
Spear Motor Co., 192 N. C. 377, 381, 135 S. E. 115, 117 (1926).
8 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, 10 Sup. Ct. 175, 31 L. ed. 440(1889) ; Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Bibb, 164 Ala. 62, 51 So. 345 (1909) ;
see North Carolina Lumber Co. v. Spear Motor Co., 192 N. C. 377,. 381, 135
S. E. 115, 117 (1926).
' Pearson v. Potter Co., 10 Cal. App. 245, 101 Pac. 681 (1909); Ruehl v.
Lidgerwood Rural Tel. Co., 23 N. D. 6, 135 N. W. 793 (1913).
" Robinson v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 237 U. S. 84, 35 Sup. Ct. 491, 59 L.
ed. 849 (1915); Hull v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., 252 U. S. 475, 40 Sup. Ct.
358, 64 L. ed. 670 (1919); Stiedler v. Pennsylvania R. R., 94 N. J. L. 197,
109 Atl. 512 (1920).
" Robinson v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 237 U. S. 84, 35 Sup. Ct. 491, 59 L.
ed. 849 (1915); Lindsay v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 226 Fed. 23 (C. C. A. 7th,
1915) ; Denver & R. G. Ry. v. Whan, 39 Colo. 230, 89 Pac. 39 (1907).
" Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 41 Sup. Ct. 93, 65 L. ed.
205 (1920) ; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. West, 39 Okla. 581, 134 Pac. 655 (1913)
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Blalock, 105 Tex: 296, 147 S. W. 559 (1912).
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between the Pullman company and the railroad with a profit-sharing
arrangement the workers are held to be employees of both the Pullman
company and of the railroad.13 Servants of stevedore companies, 14 con-
struction companies, 15 and ice companies'16 hired to do specific work
are held not to be employees of the owner.
Consistent with the legislative policy of making an industry or busi-
ness bear the expense of occupational injuries to its workmen, there
has been a more liberal construction of the term "employee" under
workmen's compensation than at common law.' 7  This development
may be observed in cases dealing with the tri-partite relation under con-
sideration. For example, at common law a person in the general em-
ployment of one person could become the "special employee" of another
while doing work for the latter's benefit and under his control,'3 but,
if there were such a transfer of services, the employee became exclu-
sively the employee of the "special employer" for purposes of this par-
ticular work.19 When a workman engaged by an independent contractor
does work which the contractor has agreed to perform for the owner
of a business and the work is under the direction and control of the
latter, some compensation cases, among them the leading case of
Famous Players Lasky Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Cal-
ifornia,20 have treated the workman as the employee not of one but of
both so that he may recover compensation from either.21  In the same
situation where, however, the owner does not control the workman,
statutes frequently, without declaring the workman to be an employee
of the owner of the business, authorize recovery of compensation from
either the owner or the independent contractor provided the work was
"' Oliver v. Northern Pac. Ry., 196 Fed. 432 (E. D. Wash. 1912).
"Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Bond, 240 U. S. 449, 36 Sup. Ct. 403, 60 L.
ed. 735 (1916); Drago v. Central Ry. of N. J., 93 N. J. L. 176, 106 At. 803
(1919).
"Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Parker, 191 Ind. 686, 132 N. E. 372(1921); see State v. Bates & Rogers Const. Co., 91 Wash. 181, 184, 157 Pac.
482, 484 (1916).
"C Reynolds v. Addison Miller Co., 143 Wash. 271, 255 Pac. 110 (1927).
"7See Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Crowell, 76 F. (2d) 341, 342 (C. C. A.
5th, 1935) ; Continental Casualty Co. v. :Haynie, 51 Ga. App. 650, 653, 181 S. E.
126, 128 (1935) ; Allen-Garcia v. Industrial Comm., 334 Ill. 390, 394, 166 N. E.
78, 80 (1929); McDowell v. Duer, 78 Ind. App. 440, 445, 133 N. E. 839, 842(1933); Badger Furniture Co. v. Chapeau, 195 Wis. 134, 138, 217 N. W. 734,
736 (1928) ; 1 ScHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COmpENSATioN LAW (2d ed. 1932) §20.
' Johnson v. Boston, 118 Mass. 114 (1875); Donovan v. Laing, W. & D.
Constr. Syndicate, [1893] 1 Q. B. 629 (C. A.); 1 LABA , Op. Cit. supra note 3,
§52 et seq.
"
9 Donovan v. Laing, W. & D. Constr. Syndicate, [1893] 1 Q. B. 629 (C. A.)
I LA ar, op. cit. supra note 3 at 171, 172.
20194 Cal. 134, 228 Pac. 5 (1924).
2Diamond Drill Contracting Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of California,
199 Cal. 164, 250 Pac. 862 (1926); Wright v. Cane Run Petroleum Co., 26Z
Ky. 251, 90 S. W. (2d) 36 (1936); De Noyer v. Cavanaugh, 221 N. Y. 273,
116 N. E. 992 (1917).
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part or process of the owner's business .2  The principal case, which
in no way involved workmen's compensation, relied heavily upon a case
arising under one of these statutes. That case, Fox v. Fafnir Bearing
Co., 23 held that a window washer engaged by an independent contractor
to wash windows for a manufacturer of bearings was entitled to com-
pensation from the manufacturer because washing windows was part
and process of the business.
Insurance policies, like all contracts, should be' construed in accord-
ance with the intent of the parties. While the courts tend to at-
tribute to the word "employee" as used in these policies its ordinary
meaning,24 the intent with which the parties used the term will govern
without any "niceties of legal reasoning. '25  Thus it has been held that
the vice-president of a subsidiary company is an employee of the insured
parent company for purposes of a fidelity bond,2 0 although the relation-
ship between the officer and the parent company is not that of employee-
employer at common law.
In both robbery and burglary insurance policies the general purpose
underlying the stipulation that several employees remain on the prem-
ises is that their presence would tend to thwart any taking of insuied
goods either by independent third parties or parties acting in collusion
with the insured. 27  However, there may be a slight difference in the
type of the persons considered "employees" within the purposes of
burglary and of robbery policies. Inasmuch as burglary at common law
is the breaking into and entering a dwelling at night with intent to
commit a felony28 it is a reasonable assumption that persons in widely
separated parts of the building would be of the greatest utility in pre-
venting a breaking into the premises. On the other hand, robbery is a
taking by force or violence 29 and it is likely that "employees" as used
in robbery policies contemplates persons who would be sufficiently near
"E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §5230; ILL. REv. STAT. (State Bar Ass'n
ed., 1937) c. 48, §168; MASS. ANN. LAWS (1933) c. 152, §18; VA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1936) §1887(20); cf. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §8081(aa)
(imposing a similar liability upon "principal contractors").
23 107 Conn. 189, 139 AtI. 778 (1928), note (1928) 26 MICH. L. Rev. 938.
", Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U. S. 452, 14 Sup. Ct. 379,
38 L. ed. 231 (1893); Aschenbrenner v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
292 U. S. 80, 54 Sup. Ct. 590, 78 L. ed. 1137 (1934); Neighbors v. Life &
Casualty Co. of Tennessee, 182 Ark. 356, 31 S. W. (2d) 418 (1930) ; Ledvinska
v. Home Ins. Co. of New Mexico, 139 Md. 434, 115 AtI. 596 (1921); Farber
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 250 Mass. 250, 145 N. E. 535 (1924);
Auchincloss v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 190 App. Div. 6, 179
N. Y. Supp. 454 (1st Dep't 1919).
" Aschenbrenner v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 292 U. S. 80,
54 Sup. Ct. 590, 78 L. ed. 1137 (1934).
" Pennsylvania Car Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 4 Harr. 225,
151 Atl. 665 (Del. 1930).
"' VANCE, INsuRANCE (2d ed. 1930) §279.
28 CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES (3d ed. 1927) §400.
29 Id. at 370.
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each other to join forces in repelling an- intrusion. Of course, both rob-
bery and burglary policies usually state in detail what offense is covered
by the policy as a result of which common law definitions of these crimes
are not controlling."0 In either case an "employee" in order to secure
the contemplated protection should be one who is thoroughly familiar
with the premises and who has a feeling of responsibility to the insured.
In the principal case in considering a janitor paid by a third party,
using his implements, and largely under his control, as an employee of
the insured for purposes of a robbery policy the court ignored the rea-
sons for the "employee" requirement in the policy. In addition, the
insured's policy called for a custodian and one other employee, indi-
cating perhaps that the terms "employee" and "custodian" were used
interchangeably. Yet a custodian as defined in a typical policy3l is "any
person ... in the regular-2 employ of the insured and duly authorized
by him to act as his ...cashier, clerk, or sales person, and while so
acting to have the care and custody of the property covered hereby,
but who is not a watchman or porter." Finally, the court relied on doubt-
ful precedents from the workmen's compensation field. In some of
these decisions, such as the Fafnir case, it was merely decided that the
activity of the worker was part or process of the owner's business and
that the owner must compensate him under the act, it being unnecessary
to find that he was an employee of the owner. Even those cases which
have held in these tri-partite situations that the worker is an employee
of the owner for compensation purposes should not be controlling in
the construction of an insurance policy because of the entirely different
purposes of the compensation acts. Correspondingly, it would be ill-
advised to rely on the principal case or other insurance decisions in
determining a controversy under'a workmen's compensation act. For
to hold that the worker is an employee of the owner would result in a
denial of compensation to him when the owner is a small employer not
within the act even though the independent contractor by whom the
worker thought that he was employed was covered by the act unless the
theory of the Famous Players Lasky case were followed and both were
deemed employers. If this theory were not adopted, a result plainly
undesirable in view of the purposes of the workmen's compensation acts
would be reached because of this reliance.
MARGARET CLOYD JOHNSON.
"5 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929) §1199c.
" Sample robbery policy of Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company.
32Ibid.
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Labor Law-Sit-Down Strikes-Reinsatement of Employees
Under the Wagner Act.
Respondent employer having engaged in labor practices which it.
union employees thought to be violative of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act,' the union employees embarked on a sit-down strike. The
strikers were discharged for their refusal to vacate the buildings. After
a hearing before the National Labor Relations Board,2 respondent was
ordered to cease and desist from engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices and to offer the discharged employees reinstatement to their for-
mer positions with back pay. The board contended lhat, as the em-
ployer's unfair practices provoked the strike, the employer-employee
relationship continued despite the illegal seizure of the employer's prop-
erty, and the board in its discretion might order reinstatement of dis-
charged employees.3  The circuit court of appeals 4 set aside the board's
order of reinstatement. On certiorari the United States Supreme Court
affirmed this judgment, 5 saying that although the employees had the
right to strike, they did not have the right to commit acts of violence
or to seize the property of their employer. The acts of lawlessness,
though provoked by the unfair labor practices of respondent, furnished
ground for discharge outside the protection of the Act, because the Act
does not interfere with the employer's normal exercise of the right to
select and discharge its employees for other reasons than intimidation
or coercion of employees with respect to their self-organization and
representation for collective bargaining. And the reinstatement of the
guilty employees would ". . . not only not effectuate any policy of the
Act but would directly tend to make abortive its plan for peaceable pro-
cedure."6
149 STAT. 449 et seq. (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §151 et seq. (Supp. 1938).
The Act was sustained by the United States Supreme Court in National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615,
81 L. ed. 893 (1937); see Geffs and Hepburn, The. Wagner Labor Act Cases(1937) 22 MiNNr. L. REv. 1; Mueller, Businesses Subject to the National Labor
Relations Act (1937) 35 MicH. L. REv. 1286; C. C. H. Labor Law Serv. 12015
et seq. (new ed. 1937).
'In -re Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 NLRB 930 (1938).
'The Act empowers the board, when it shall be of the opinion that any
person named in the complaint has engaged in, or is engaging in, any unfair
labor practice ". . . to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this chapter."
49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §160(c) (Supp. 1938). The term employee
is defined as including ". . . any individual whose work has ceased as a conse-
quence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice. . . ." 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §152(3) (Supp.
1938). It is further expressly stated that "Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike." 49 STAT. 457 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §163 (Supp. 1938).
' Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 98 F.
(2d) 375 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
'National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 305 U. S.
-, 59 Sup. Ct. 490, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 469 (1939).
'Id. at -, 59 Sup. Ct. at 497, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. at 476.
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Although the interpretation given the terms of the Act by the board,
the dissenting judge in the circuit court of appeals, and the dissenting
justices in the Supreme Court seems tenable, the courts have- intimated
that the adoption of such an interpretation would result in the Act being
declared unconstitutional. The implications left by the courts have been
that an invasion of the employer's fundamental right of discharge for
proper cause would contravene the "due process" provisions of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution7 which protect that right of the
employer.8 And a!though it has been held that due process is not denied
by a statute forbidding discrimination against employees because of
union activities,9 this constitutional protection can be required to give
way only to the extent that it invades the employees' right to self-
organization and collective bargaining.10
The status of the sit-down strike has been prominent in labor dis-
cussions. In support of the argument for the legality of this form of
labor weapon, it is contended that the employees have a property right
in their jobs and may assert that right by maintaining possession of the
employer's premises while they negotiate about their conditions. Their
presence in the industrial plant, does not violate their obligations as
employees so long as they refrain from fraud and violence. They are
not trespassers; they are still employees with all of their relations in-
" In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U. S. 1, 46, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 628, 81 L. ed. 893, 916 (1937), the Supreme Court
indicates that ". . . the Board is not entitled to make its authority a pretext
for interference with the right of discharge when that right is exercised for
other reasons than . . . intimidation or coercion." And in the opinion of the
circuit court of appeals in the principal case, 98 F. (2d) 375, 381 (C. C. A.
7th, 1938), it was said: "Certainly it cannot be denied that an employer is war-
ranted in discharging his employees, and severing that relationship, when they
take and retain exclusive possession of his property against his will." In the
prevailing opinion of the Supreme Court in the principal case, 305 U. S. -,
-, 59 Sup. Ct. 490, 496, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 469, 474 (1939), it was said: "We
are unable to conclude that Congress intended to compel employers to retain
persons in their employ regardless of their unlawful conduct,-to invest
those who go on strike with an immunity from discharge for acts of. trespass
or violence against the employer's property, which they would not have enjoyed
had they remained at work. Apart from the question of the constitutional validity
of an enactment of that sort, it is enough to say that such a legislative inten-
tion should be found in some definite and unmistakable expression." This view
is further expounded in the concurring opinion, id. at -, 59 Sup. Ct. at 500,
83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. at 479, by this language: "If a plainer indication of such
a purpose had been given . . .I should have thought it of sufficiently dubious
constitutionality to require us to construe its language otherwise, if that could
be reasonably done, leaving it to Congress to say so, in unmistakable language,
if it really meant to impose that duty on the employer."
' Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. ed. 436 (1908).
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S.
1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893 (1937).
" Texas & N. 0. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks,
281 U. S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427, 74 L. ed. 1034 (1930) ; Virginian Ry. v. System
Federation, 300 U. S. 515, 57 Sup. Ct. 592, 81 L. ed. 789 (1937) ; National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615,
81 L. ed. 893 (1937).
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tact. 1 The argument contemplates a peaceful settlement of the dis-
pute; but the courts that have ,passed on the question have negatived
this conception by denying the existence of peacefulness where em-
ployees seize the property of their employer and refuse to surrender pos-
session of the premises. The courts reason that the right of employees
to be upon their employer's premises is by reason of their employment ;12
and that when this employment is terminated, whether by their volun-
tary act13 or by their discharge, and whether they cease their labors
individually or in a body, their right upon the employer's premises
ceases forthwith. 14  It is further argued that the conduct of the sit-
'down strikers operates to cancel their rights to be on the premises,
because they thereby cease to discharge their duties as employees and
assume a position never contemplated within the purpose for which
they were employed. Though they entered the premises under a legal
right, their subsequent conduct makes them trespassers.'5 One court
even went so far as to declare that a sit-down strike amounted to a
conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce and a violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.' In all of these cases there is no doubt
that the strike itself is called for a proper purpose. 17  The trouble
grows out of the means used to attain the objective.' 8 Decisions on the
"Green, The Case for the Sit-Down Strike (March 24, 1937), 90 NEW RE-
'PUBLIC 199.
" The mere fact that they worked in the plant does not give them, for the
purpose of protecting their jobs, a property right in the plant and the equipment
as against the employer who is admittedly the owner. To hold otherwise would
lead to the "abolition of the right to property". Ohio Leather Co. v. De Chant,
Common Pleas, Trumbull County, Ohio, (1937) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 951.
" In some workmen's compensation cases it has been held that the worker
who strikes has voluntarily given up his job and his rights in it. Brown v. Central
West Coal Co., 200 Mich. .174, 166 N. W. 850 (1918); Mendoza v. Gallup
Southwestern Coal Co., 41 N. M. 161, 66 P. (2d) 426 (1937).
4 Plecity v. Local No. 37, International Union of Bakery and Confectionery
Workers of America, Superior Ct., Los Angeles County, Cal., (1937) 4 U. S. L.
WEEK 898.
Earlier decisions have established the proposition that it is a trespass to
retain the employer's property after the employment, of which the right to
possession and use is an incident, has voluntarily ceased. Lane v. Au Sable
Electric Co., 181 Mich. 26, 147 N. W. 546 (1914); Bowman v. Bradley, 151
Pa. 351, 24 Atl. 1062 (1892); Case v. Knight, 129 Wash. 570, 225 Pac. 645
(1924) - note (1937) 35 Mica. L. REv. 1330, 1339.
"5 From an argument presented upon the floor of Congress by Mr. Anderson
of Missouri, 81 CONG. RFc. 3168, 3169 (1937).
16 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 90 F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1937), dis-
missed o1 appeal as a moot question, 302 U. S. 656, 58 Sup. Ct. 140, 82 L. ed.
508 (1937).
" Strikes for higher wages, shorter hours, and for the right to organize and
bargain collectively have been held legal. See WITTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN
LABOR Dispumis (1932) 20; note (1937) 23 VA. L. REv. 799, 802.
" The existence of a legal purpose of the strikers' action has never been
deemed sufficient to justify tortious conduct on the part of the strikers. See
Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 81, 159 N. E. 863, 869(1928); FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcInON (1930) 24; (1937)
85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 643, 644.
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subject are few, but the courts are all inclined to the view that the sit-
down strike is illegal ;19 and some states have recently passed statutes
specifically outlawing this weapon of labor.20
In the principal case the United States Supreme Court assumed the
sit-down strike to be illegal, even in a situation where none of the em-
ployer's property is destroyed. 21  But it would seem that the decision
of the Supreme Court as to the legality of the sit-down strike is not
binding upon, but is merely persuasive authority for, the state courts
in their applications of the local civil and criminal laws to the acts of the
strikers when no statute raising a constitutional issue is involved.22
There is reason to believe, however, that a statute seeking to validate
the sit-down strike would so invade the owner's right to the free use
and possession of his property as to offend the "due process" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 But, though it appears that whether
the strikers' acts are illegal must be determined by state law, it is not
felt that the language of the instant case means that any minor infrac-
tion of state law will preclude the board from reinstating a discharged
" Prior to the decision in the principal case the illegality of the sit-down
strike had been announced in the following cases: Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
90 F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1937), dismissed 'on apipeal as a moot question.
302 U. S. 656, 58 Sup. Ct. 140, 82 L. ed. 508 (1937) ; The Oakmar, 20 F. Supp.
650 (D. Md. 1937); The Losmar, 20 F. Supp. 887 (D. Md. 1937); Plecity v.
Local No. 37, International Union of Bakery and Confectionery Workers of
America, Superior Ct., Los Angeles County, Cal., (1937) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 898;
General Motors Corp. v. International Union, United Automobile Workers of
America, Cir. Ct., Genesee County, Mich., (1937) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 678;
Chrysler Corp. v. International Union, United Automobile Workers of America,
Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., (1937) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 858.
"
0The following statutes have the effect of outlawing the sit-down strike:
ILL. RaV. STAT. (State Bar Ass'n ed., 1937) c. 38, §§376, 377, 378; Mass. Acts
1938, c. 345; Tenn. Acts 1937, c. 160; Vt. Laws 1937, n. 210, p. 251.
"1 "The seizure and holding of the buildings was itself a wrong apart from
any acts of sabotage." National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 305 U. S. -, -, 59 Sup. Ct. 490, 495, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 469, 473 (1939).
"Here the strike was illegal in its inception and prosecution." Id. at -, 59 Sup.
Ct. at 496, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. at 475.
" Bethell v. Demaret, 10 Wall. 537, 19 L. ed. 1007 (U. S. 1871); United
States v. Thompson, 93 U. S. 586, 23 L. ed. 982 (1877).
3 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States declares that no state shall ". . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . ." The sit-down strike begins with
an unauthorized physical seizure of another's property, and a violation of his
right to possess and enjoy the use of that property. Though the employer's right
to the use of his property has been limited to the extent that a statute forbidding
discrimination against employees because of union activities has been upheld, in
the absence of such discrimination his rights of ownership and the exercise of
dominion over his property cannot be invaded. National Labor Relations Board
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893 (1937).
It has been held that the legislature cannot prevent the granting of an injunction
against the intimidation and coercion of a merchant's employees by a labor union
for the purpose of compelling him topay the union's scale of prices to his em-
ployees, since it interferes with his constitutional right to acquire, possess, enjoy,
and protect property. Goldberg, B. & Co. v. Stablemen's Union, 149 Cal. 429,
86 Pac. 806 (1906).
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employee.24 Justifiable discharge under the "Wagner Act is not to be
thus dependent upon the vagaries of state statutes and decisions. Rather
the Court apparently feels that the striker's illegal act must be of a
sufficiently serious degree as to fall within that "selected illegality"
which the Court deems heinous enough to warrant a discharge which
the board has no power to countermand. The principal case indicates
that without other violence a seizure of the employer's plant falls within
that "selected illegality". What other acts come within the category
can only be a matter of conjecture until the specific case is presented
for decision.25 The Court, in a case decided on the same day as the
principal case, characterized the principal case as saving to the employer
the right to discharge employees guilty of a tort against him ;26 but such
a general statement is of little help in defining.what particular acts will
be "selected" by the Court as being good cause for discharge. More-
over, there still remains the question as to whether the Court will con-
tinue its present stand in determining whether the board's action would
"effectuate the policies of the Act". Unless the board's action is abso-
lutely beyond the ken of reasonableness or is arbitrary or capricious, a
judicial review and determination of what will "effectuate the policies
of the Act" seems to be an unwarranted assumption of authority by the
Court, and an invasion of the exercise of the discretion granted by
Congress to the board.
FRANK THOMAS MILLER, JR.
Mortgages-Conditional Sales-After Acquired Property Clauses--
Status of Conditionally Sold Property When Affixed to Previously
Encumbered Realty or- Personalty.
X purchased an automobile f'om D, executing a conditional sale
contract, which was recorded, for the balance of the purchase price.
This contract contained an after acquired property clause providing
that the lien should cover "any equipment, repairs, replacements or
"
4Where a discharged employee has been engaging in union activities and is
also guilty of unlawful conduct, the board, on hearing before it, makes findings
of fact to determine which of these elements was the dominating force in caus-
ing the discharge; for when it is found that the discharge is motivated by the
employer's prejudice against union activities and not by the employee's mis-
conduct, the discharge is discriminatory and a violation of Section 8(3) of the
Act, 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §158(3) (Supp. 1938), leaving the board
with power to order reinstatement.
'6The board has been denied the power to reinstate discharged employees
who were found guilty and sentenced to jail for conspiring to destroy property.
Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 97 F. (2d)
531 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
"6 "The Act does not prohibit an effective discharge for repudiation by the
employee of his agreement, any more than it prohibits such discharge for a
tort committed against the employer." National Labor Relations Board v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 305 U. S. -, -, 59 Sup. Ct. 508, 514, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops.
488, 494 (1939).
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accessories thereafter placed on the car". Later X purchased tires and
tubes from P, executing a chattel mortgage on both the tires and au-
tomobile to secure the purchase price. This was also recorded. Upon
default, D repossessed the car, and P instituted claim and delivery pro-
ceedings for the tires. Held, judgment for P, his lien being superior
to that of D and not being defeated by accession or the after acquired
property clause.'
Today after acquired property clauses contained in mortgages are
generally considered valid,2 the majority of jurisdictions holding that
a lien attaches to the newly acquired property as soon as it comes into
the mortgagor's possession. 3 'North Carolina decisions are in accord
with this view, regarding such a provision as valid between the parties4
and as giving rise to a lien superior to that of a vendee5 or attaching
creditor0 of the mortgagor. It is almost universally held, however,
that if the after acquired property is encumbered with a lien at the
time it comes into the mortgagor's possession, such lien is superior to
that of the after acquired property clause, though junior to it in point
of time.7 Thus when the vendor of after acquired property takes a
purchase money mortgage or a conditional sale lien thereon,3 as in
the principal case, the law treats the sale and execution of the mortgage
as one instantaneous transaction so that the lien of the prior mortgage
does not have time to attach and displace the lien thereby created.9
North Carolina follows this view,' 0 and holds further that the failure
by the vendor to register the conditional sale contract, does not defeat
the lien in favor of that of the prior mortgagee,'1 as our registration
Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. Caesar, 214 N. C. 85, 197 S. E. 698 (1938).
2 Central Trust Co. v. Kneeland, 138 U. S. 414, 11 Sup. Ct. 357, 34 L. ed. 1014
(1891); Gerard Trust Co. v. Standard Gas Co., 93 N. J. Eq. 307, 115 Atl. 910
(Ch. 1922).
Bear Lake Irrigation Co. v. Garland, 164 U. S. 1, 17 Sup. Ct. 7, 41 L. ed. 327
(1896); Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 811 (1890); Hirshkind v.
Israel, 18 S. C. 157 (1882) ; Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191 (1862) ;- 1
JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES (6th ed. 1933) §173; (1924) 37 HAgv. L. REv. 765.
'Perry v. White, 111 N. C. 197, 16 S. E. 172 (1892).
1 Brown v. Dail, 117 N. C. 41, 23 S. E. 45 (1895).
'Merchants & Farmers Bank v. Pearson, 186 N. C. 609, 120 S. E. 210 (1923).
'United States v. New Orleans R. R., 12 Wall. 362, 20 L. ed. 434 (U. S.
1870); Tippett & Wood v. Barhara, 180 Fed. 76 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910), 37 L. R. A.
(w.s.) 119 (1912) ; 1 JONES, CHAT EL MORTGAGES (6th ed. 1933) §247.
8 Fosdick v. Southwestern Car Co., 99 U. S. 256, 25 L. ed. 344 (1878) ; Ham-
mel v. First Nat. Bank of Hancock, 129 Micl. 176, 88 N. W. 397 (1901).
9 Myer v. Western Car Co., 102 U. S. 1, 26 L. ed. 59 (1880) ; Tippett & Wood
v. Barham, 180 Fed. 76 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910); Lumbert v. Woodard, 144 Ind.
335, 43 N. E. 302 (1896).
1" Cox v. Newbern Lighting & Fuel Co., 151 N. C. 62, 65 S. E. 648 (1909).
"Standard Dry Kiln Co. v. Ellington, 172 N. C. 481, 90 S. E. 564 (1916);
note (1930) 9 N. C. L. Rav. 205. But cf. Clark v. Hill, 117 N. C. 11, 23 S. E. 91
(1895) (The holding of this case that as the conditional sale contract was.un-
recorded title to the fixture went to the prior mortgagee is not mentioned in later
cases.)
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laws are intended to protect the subsequent, not the prior purchasers
and creditors.
Although a purchase money lien on a chattel is not defeated by the
fact that previous to sale the vendee has given an after acquired prop-
erty mortgage, will it be defeated when the chattel subject to such lien
is attached by the vendee to the property already encumbered? If the
chattel is attached to encumbered real property the answer to this ques-
tion depends upon whether, in legal contemplation, the chattel has been
affixed to the soil or realty in such a manner as to lose its identity as
personal property and become itself a part of the realty. If it has,
it passes with the prior real property mortgage and the purchase money
lien is defeated. 12
The exact nature of the physical connection that must be made be-
fore a chattel in any case becomes a part of realty presents a problem
in property law beyond the scope of this note. It is possible, however,
that even though the requirement of physical attachment be satisfied,
a chattel will not lose its identity as personalty because the interested
parties have contracted against this result. 13 When a mortgagor buys
a chattel free of encumbrances and there is a sufficient physical at-
tachment, his intent that it become realty is evidenced by the fact of
annexation, and the chattel passes with the mortgage. 14 But when a
mortgagor buys subject to a purchase money lien, most courts are
disposed to give the purchase money mortgage or conditional sale con-
tract the effect of a stipulation between vendor and vendee that the
chattel remain personalty.15 Since the interests of the prior mortgagee,
who was not a party to this stipulation, may be adversely affected by
a removal of the chattel from the realty, this implied stipulation is not
always enforced. Various tests are applied to determine whether it
will or will not be enforced.16
There are certain types of chattels such as bricks, mortar, and lum-
ber united to form a building, 1 7 railroad irons laid on a track,18 or
12 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) §266.
" Title & Bond Guaranty Co. v. Pointer, 243 Mich. 415, 2-20 N. W. 786 (1928);
BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) §153.1 Whitaker-Glessmer Co. v. Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co., 22 F. (2d) 773
(C. C. A. 6th, 1927) ; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Lowery, 231 Ala. 119, 163 So.
629 (1935); Morgan Utilities Inc. v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 183 Ark, 492,
37 S. W. (2d) 90 (1931); First Mortgage Bond Co. v. London, 259 Mich. 688,
244 N. W. 203 (1932); Love v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 168 Miss. 408, 150
So. 794 (1933).
" Whitney-Central Trust & Savings Bank v. Luck, 231 Fed. 431 (C. C. A. 5th,
1916) ; Bromich v. Burkholder, 98 Kan. 261, 158 Pac. 63 (1916) ; Perfect Lighting
Fixtures Co. v. Grubar Realty Corp., 228 App. Div. 141, 239 N. Y. Supp. 286
(lst Dep't 1930) ; Miller v. McCarthy, 148 Ore. 310, 36 P. (2d) 346 (1934)
King v. Blickfeldt, 111 Wash. 508, 191 Pac. 748 (1920).
Note (1934) 88 A. L. R. 1318.
See Campbell v. Ro dy, 44 N. J. Eq. 244, 252, 14 Atl. 279, 283 (1888).
's See United States v. New Orleani R. R. 12 Wall. 362, 365, 20 L. ed. 434,
436 (U. S. 1870).
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a building built upon the land,19 which, when there has been a physical
attachment, are universally considered realty in the absence of any
contract to the contrary by all interested parties. With the exceptibn
of this type of annexation, the rule adopted by the great majority of
courts is that the implied stipulation of the vendor and vendee that the
chattel remain personalty will be given effect and the seller's lien will
be superior if the chattel can be detached without material injury to
the premises.20
However, a conflict arises in determining what constitutes material
injury to the premises. The test applied by the majority of courts
which follow this general rule is whether the removal of the fixture
2 1
will cause actual physical injury to the freehold2 2 such as injury to
a wall by tearing out pipes.23 Another line of cases imposing a slightly
different standard speak of injury to the original security.24 These
cases suggest that if the fixture replaces a chattel of substantial value
the mortgagee of the realty is entitled to collect for the old one on
surrendering or paying for the new.25  Still another criterion is the
institutional test. The courts applying this test maintain that the ven-
dor's lien is lost and the added equipment passes with the realty if it
has become an essential and permanent part of a going plant,26 even
10 See Burbridge v. Therrell, 110 Fla. 6, 10, 148 So. 204, 205 (1933) ; 1 JoNEs,
CHATTEL MORTGAGES (5th ed. 1908) §130; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed.
1920) §271.
"0H-olt v. Henly, 232 U. S. 637, 34 Sup. Ct. 459, 58 L. ed. 767 (1914) ; First
Nat. Bank of Evanston v. Bank of Waynesboro, 262 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 8th,
1919); International Machinery Co. v. Moultrie Banking Co., 34 Ga. App.
396, 129 S. E. 877 (1925); Bromich v. Burkholder, 98 Kan. 261, 158 Pac. 63
(1916) ; Ratchford v. Cayuga County Cold Storage Co., 217 N. Y. 565, 112 N. E.
447 (1916) ; Standard Motors Finance Co. v. Weaver, 199 N. C. 178, 153 S. E.
861 (1930). In Holt v. Henly, supra, Holmes, J., says at p. 641 of the official
report: "To hold that the mere fact of annexing the system to the freehold
over-rode the agreement that it should remain personalty and still belong to Holt
would be to give a mystic importance to attachment by bolts and screws."
- The word fixture is used in this note in its popular sense, meaning any
annexation to the realty, and not in its legal sense.
22 Hachmeister v. Power Mfg. Co., 165 Ark. 469, 264 S. W. 976 (1924); Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Piasa Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Ill. App. 389 (1934) ; Ratchford
v. Cayuga County Cold Storage Co., 217 N. Y. 565, 112 N. E. 447 (1916); Stand-
ard Motors Finance Co. v. Weaver, 199 N. C. 178, 153 S. E. 861 (1930) ; Lenoir
Land Co. v. Haynes Heating Co., 166 Tenn. 494, 63 S. W. (2d) 659 (1933);
People's Savings & Trust Co. v. Munsert, 212 Wis. 449, 249 N. W. 527 (1933);
note (1934) 88 A. L. R. 1318.
"0 Evans v. Argenta Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 180 Ark. 654, 22 S. W. (2d) 377
(1930).
24 Binkley v. Forkner, 117 Ind. 176, 19 N. E. 753 (1889); Bromich v. Burk-
holder, 98 Kan. 261, 158 Pac. 63 (1916); Kramer v. Yocum, 104 N. J. Eq. 79,
144 Atl. 188 (Ch. 1929) ; Holland Furnace Co. v. Byrd, 45 Wyo. 471, 21 P. (2d)
825 (1933).
25In re Dana Bros., 250 Fed. 268 (S. D. Fla. 1918) ; Franklin Service Stores
v. Sterling Motor Co., 50 R. I. 336, 147 Atl. 754 (1929) ; see Cox v. Newbern
Lighting & Fuel Co., 151 N. C. 62. 68, 65 S. E. 648, 651 (1909).
"In re Moultrie Creamery & Produce Co., 2 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924);
Holland v. Bartholomew, 93 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 3d. 1937) ; Dauch v. Ginsberg,
214 Cal. 540, 6 P. (2d) 952 (1931) ; MacLeod v. Satterthwait, 109 N. J. Eq. 414,
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though it could be detached without physical injury to the real property.
Although the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, which has been'adopted
in a few states,2 incorporates the majority test of physical injury to
the freehold,28 two of the states which had used the institutional test
prior to its passage still use it in interpreting this phrase.2 9
A very small minority of courts, following what is known as the
Massachusetts rule, absolutely refuse to consider any application of the
material injury test. They hold that an express or implied contract
that the fixture remain personalty is not binding on the prior mortgagee
of realty unless he expressly assents thereto. 30
. When a conditionally sold article is attached to encumbered per-
sonal property, as in the principal case, the same question presents it-
self: When does the chattel become an integral part of the personalty
so as to defeat the lien of the conditional vendor? Analogous to the
real property situation, the requirement of the doctrine of accessional
that there be a physical attachment of the chattel to the principal per-
sonalty may be met, yet, by the great weight of authority, the implied
stipulation of the conditional vendor or mortgagor that this chattel is
to remain a distinct one will be effectuated and the chattel will not pass
by accession if it can be removed without material injury to the princi-
pal personalty.
32
157 Atl. 670 (Ch.,1932) ; see Commonvealth Trust Co. v. Harkins, 312 Pa. 402,
406, 167 At. 278, 280 (1933).2
'Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
" UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES Acr §7.
2 MacLeod v. Satterthwait, 109 N. J. Eq. 414, 157 Atl. 670 (Ch. 1932) ; see
Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Harkins, 312 Pa. 402, 406, 167 Atl. 278, 280 (1933);
notes (1934) 88 A. L. R. 1318, (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. REv. 916.
" Murphy Door Bed Co. v. New England Bond Co., 276 Mass. 79, 176 N. E.
802 (1931); Hamilton v. Huntly, 78 Ind. 521 (1881); Gaunt v. Allen-Lane Co.,
128 Me. 41, 145 Atl. 255 (1929), 73 A. L. R. 748 (1931) ; Banker's & Merchant's
Credit Co. v. Harlem Park Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 160 Md. 230, 153 Adt. 64 (1931).
" "As a term of legal classification, accession is generally employed to signify
the acquisition of title to personal property by its incorporation into, or union
with other property." 2 BERRY, AuTomoBnEs (6th ed. 1929) §1806.
" Alley v. Adams, 44 Ala. 609 (1870) ; Motor Credit Co. v. Smith, 181 Ark.
127, 24 S. W. (2d) 974, 68 A. L. R. 1242 (1930); Snyder v. Aker, 134 Misc.
721, 236 N. Y. Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1929) ; Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. Caesar,
214 N. C. 85, 197 S. E. 698 (1938) ; K. C. Tire Co. v. Way Motor Co., 143 Okla.
87, 287 Pac. 993 (1930).
In the automobile cases, where most present day litigation of this type arises,
the same rule prevails. 3 BLASEHFIELD, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAw (1927)
2370; note (1934) 92 A. L. R. 425. Following this rule the courts have declared
that title did not pass by accession under a mortgage on the automobile, where
the vendor had reserved title for the purchase price, in the following instances:
tires and tubes, Tire Shop v. Peat, 115 Conn. 187, 161 Att. 96 (1932) ; batteries,
Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. Pratt Motor Co., 198 Minn. 259, 269 N. W. 464
(1936); a "Form-a-truck" body, Hallman v. Dothan Foundry Machine Co., 17
Ala. App. 152, 82 So. 642 (1919) ; and a gasoline power unit, Lincoln Road Equip-
ment Co. v. Bolton, 127 Neb. 224, 254 N. W. 884 (1934). Simple accessories,
such as nuts, bolts, and flooring are always held to have lost their identity and
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The North Carolina cases involving annexations to real and per-
sonal property would appear to be consistent with the majority views 3
were it not for one case.34 There the accessory installed was a motor,
the vendor taking a mortgage on the whole automobile to secure in-
debtedness for repairs and the balance of the purchase price of the
motor. The court held that the motor had become an integral part of
the car by accession and also that the vendor's mortgage on the whole
car was second to the prior recorded mortgage of the vendor of the
automobile. It is arguable that a mortgage for the purchase price of
the motor, taken on the whole automobile, should include a purchase
money mortgage on the motor itself, giving the purchaser only an in-
stantaneous title so that the lien of the prior mortgage should not
attach. 85 Yet the court in the principal case distinguishes that case on
the ground that there the mortgage of the vendor of the motor was
second to the recorded lien of the conditional vendor of the automobile
because both were mortgages of the whole. This leaves undisturbed
the other basis for the decision that the motor had become an integral
and inseparable part of the car.36 However, the motor of a modern
automobile is interchangeable, may be detached without harm to the
automobile, and is easily identifiable by serial number. Therefore, it
should not be subject to the claims of the prior mortgagee under the
majority test.
The majority rule would seem to be the most equitable to all par-
ties concerned. It is fair to the conditional vendor of equipment in that
it gives him an enforceable security where the chattel may be removed
without material injury to the mortgaged property. It works no in-
justice to the prior mortgagee of realty or personality, because the new
parts and equipment probably enhance the value of the security and
he takes them subject only to the possibility that the lien of the con-
ditional seller may be enforced. Such a rule also benefits the mort-
gagor, in that it encourages dealers to sell him equipment essential
to his business operations without having to seek out the mortgagee
and ask for a release.
V rLLIAM W. SPEIGHT.
are considered an integral and inseparable part of the whole. 2 BERRY, AuTo-
moBiLEs (6th ed. 1929) §1806.
"Cox v. Newbern Lighting & Fuel Co., 151 N. C. 62, 65 S. E. 648 (1909);
Standard Dry Kiln Co. v. Ellington, 172 N. C. 481, 90 S. E. 564 (1916) ; Stand-
ard Motors Finance Co. v. Weaver, 199 N. C. 178, 153 S. E. 861 (1930); Good-
rich Silvertown Stores v. Caesar, 214 N. C. 85, 197- S. E. 698 (1938).
" Twin City Motor Co. v. Rouzer Motor Co., 197 N. C. 371, 148 S. E. 461(1929).
" K. C. Tire Co. v. Way Motor Co., 143 Okla. 87, 287 Pac. 993 (1930) ; note(1934) 92 A. L. R. 425.
"Notes (1932) 7 IND. L. J. 507, (1936) 70 U. S. L. REv. 363.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Mortgages---Deeds of Trust-Limitation on Period in Which
Power of Sale May Be Exercised.
By statute in North Carolina, where the mortgagor is in possession
of the encumbered premises, an "action for foreclosure" is limited
to ten years after default or date of last payment on the obligation.'
By another provision, a power of sale "shall become inoperative" when
an action to foreclose would be barred by the Statute of Limitations. 2
In a recent North Carolina case, a deed of trust had been executed to
secure a note maturing on November 16, 1921. No payments were
made on the obligation of the mortgagor. In foreclosure under the
power of sale in the deed of trust, a sale was held at public auction
September 2, 1930, but the trustee's deed was not executed to the pur-
chaser until April 3, 1936. In an action of ejectment by a plaintiff
claiming through the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, held for defend-
ant, as the power of sale was not exercised within the period required
by statute.3
It was early held that the section relating to the limitation on an
action for foreclosure did not apply to a foreclosure under a power of
sale. That section applies only to "actions" and foreclosure by power
of sale is not an "action" within the terms of that statute.4 As a re-
sult, before the subsequent enactment, the only limitation on a power
of sale was that of an equitable nature growing out of unreasonable
delay,5 or possibly out of a presumption of payment. 6 Apparently the
subsequent provision was enacted to remedy this situation.
No other case seems to have arisen involving the validity of a pur-
chaser's title where, though all the other acts in the exercise of the
power of sale were performed within the limitation period prescribed
by statute, the deed to the purchaser was executed after expiration of
that period. A few cases have arisen where publication of notice was
begun within the period but the sale was held after the running of the
statute, and they are in conflict as to the validity of the foreclosure.
However, the conflict is explainable, since the statutes in the cases sus-
taining the foreclosure apparently required only that proceedings to
foreclose be begun within that period.7 The cases holding the fore-
closure barred reasoned that to hold otherwise would be legislation and
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §437(3).
2 Id. §2589.
' Spain v. Hines. 214 N. C. 432, 200 S. E. 25 (1938).
' Menzel v. Hinton, 132 N. C. 660, 44 S. E. 385. (1903) ; Cone v. Hyatt, 132
N. C. 810, 44 S. E. 678 (1903).
'See Stevens v. Osgood, 18 S. D. 247, 249, 100 N. W. 161 (1904); WALSH,
MORTGAGES (1934) §73,
02 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §1533. But see Menzel v. Hinton, 132
N. C. 660, 666, 44 S. E. 385, 388 (1903).
'Gates v. Chandler, 174 Miss. 815, 165 So. 442 (1936) ; Friel v. Alevell, 318
Mo. 1. 298 S. W. 762 (1927).
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not adjudication, since the statutes required that foreclosure be had
within the period, and publication of notice is not foreclosure ;8 but the
indication was that the requirements of the statutes would be satisfied
if the sale were had within the period.
The court in the principal case contents itself with a conclusion
predicated upon this syllogism: the statute requires that the power of
sale must be completely exercised within the prescribed period; the
passing of a complete title is necessary to the complete exercise of the
power; a deed is necessary to the vesting of a complete title; therefore,
a deed must be executed to the purchaser within the prescribed period.9
Thus by "juggling with legal concepts", the conclusion becomes in-
evitable. 10
Title, like most legal concepts, is a useful device of legal thought.
It is a handy term for labeling as a whole that group of rights which
the law recognizes as incident to the ownership of property. However,
where one is concerned with apportioning rights of ownership between
several parties, the concept serves to cloud rather than clarify the issues
involved 1 by causing the courts to lose sight of the concept as simply
an aid to their thinking and so to vitalize the logical consequence of the
premise as to exclude important factors in the determination of a par-
ticular case. In the principal case, the question was whether there had
been foreclosure within the prescribed period. The solution would seem
to turn upon whether the ptirchaser had divested the mortgagor of the
substantive rights of property within that time. It would therefore
seem proper to inquire as to the status of a purchaser at foreclosure
who gets no deed, i.e., the rights he had acquired even though he had
rio deed at the time the statutory period elapsed.
A few early cases held that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale with-
out a deed could not maintain ejectment,1 2 but rather than indicating
that any substantial property interest remained in the mortgagor, the
cases are explainable by the formalism of the common law in requiring
"legal title" as a prerequisite to the action of ejectment.'3  It has been
held that a purchaser without a deed may maintain an action to quiet
title.14 The basis of the courts' conclusion was the fact that the pur-
'Duncan v. Menard, 32 Minn. 460, 21 N. W. 714 (1884) ; Blackwell v. Bar-
nett, 52 Tex. 326 (1879).
See Spain v. Hines, 214 N. C. 432, 436, 200 S. E. 25, 28 (1938).
" See DICKINsoN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW
(1927) 135.
" See Fuller, Legal Fictions (1931) 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, at 899.
"2 Sanders v. McDonald, 63 Md. 503 (1885); Leynan v. Whiting, 20 Barb.
559 (N. Y. 1855) ; Tripp v. Ide, 3 R. I. 51 (1854). An equitable title apparently
Will support an action of ejectment in North Carolina. Note (1938) 16 N. C. L.
Rzv. 306. " SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING (3d ed. 1923) 178.
"Morgan v. Kendrick, 91 Ark. 394, 121 S. W. 278 (1909) ; Bennett v. Mor-
rison, 78 Colo. 464, 242 Pac. 636 (1925) ; Bell v. Diesern, 86 Kan. 364, 121 Pac.
335 (1912).
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chase price had been paid-a fact which appears expressly or by strong
inference in all the cases discussed hereinafter except where it is specif-
ically designated otherwise. Putting the purchaser into possession of
the premises does not violate the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
against "seizure" of a debtor's property.' 5  The mortgagor has no
equitable right to redeem though the purchaser has no deed.10 And
it has been held that during the interim between the foreclosure sale
and the delivery of a deed, the mortgagor's interest is a mere right in
the excess of the proceeds of the sale over the amount of the debt;
thus a judgment debtor of the mortgagor whose lien was acquired dur-
ing the interim gets no priority since the mortgagor's right is a chose
and not an estate.' 7  Moreover, a purchaser at foreclosure without a
deed may recover rents and profits for the period the mortgagor con-
tinues in possession.' 8 However, in a Massachusetts case,'0 cited with
approval in the principal case, 20 a purchaser was refused the rents and
profits between the time of sale and the execution of a deed where the
foreclosure was by power of sale. The court reasoned that the auction
sale was a mere contract of sale. But the cases cited as sustaining
the holding of the court were all cases involving the right to rents and
profits between the time decreed for a sale and the .time decreed for
'the execution of a deed to the purchaser.21 The result of those au-
thorities was not attributable to the fact the purchaser did not have a
paper title. The conclusion of. the court in each of those cases was
based solely on the fact that the rights during the interim depended
" Glenn v. Hallum, 80 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
" Mewburn v. Bass, 82 Ala. 622, 2 So. 520 (1887); Union Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Childrey, 97 N. J. Eq. 20, 127 Atl. 253 (Ch. 1924); cf. Demarest v.
Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129 (N. Y. 1817). But see Arnot v. McClure, 4 Denio
41, 45 (N. Y. 1847). A peculiar Illinois statute limits the right of a purchaser
to convert his certificate of sale into a deed to five years after the expiration of
the mortgagor's equity of redemption, making the certificate of sale void there-
after. Where a purchaser had failed to get his deed within the prescribed period,
the statute was interpreted to bar his right to a deed and to vest complete title
back in the mortgagor discharged of the encumbrance. Bradley v. Lightcap, 201
11. 511, 66 N. E. 546 (1903) (vigorous dissent ,by two justices, one justice
specially concurring). The feeling of the United States Supreme Court toward
this interpretation is reflected in its holding overruling the Illinois court on the
rather doubtful constitutional grounds that the statute impairs the obligation of
contract, since it was passed subsequent to the execution of the mortgage. Brad-
ley v. Lightcap, 195 U. S. 1, 24 Sup. Ct. 748, 49 L. ed. 65 (1904).
"'Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 Atl. 509 (1927). It does not
appear whether the purchase price was paid here, the court saying the complete
equitable title vested at the time of the bid at the auction sale.
"
8Bates v. Bank of Moulton, 226 Ala. 679, 148 So. 150 (1933). The court
speaks here, however, as though no deed were necessary to vest title in the pur-
chaser since the mortgagee purchased. See note 38, infra.
"Beal v. Attleboro Say. Bank, 248 Mass. 342, 142 N. E. 789 (1924). See also
Eirich v. Leitschuh, 81 Ill. App. 573, 575 (1898).
"' Spain v. Hines, 214 N. C. 432, 436, 200 S. E. 25, 28 (1938).
2Astor v. Turner, 11 Paige 436 (N. Y. 1845); Clason v. Corley, 7 N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 447 (1852) ; Cheney v. Woodruff, 45 N. Y. 98 (1871) ; Garrett v. Dewart,
43 Pa. 342 (1862).
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upon the terms of the -decree, by which. the purchaser was not entitled
to a deed until the date decreed for the conveyance. Where foreclosure
is by power of sale, however, and the purchaser is immediately entitled
to a deed, it does not follow from those authorities that the purchaser's
rights do not accrue until the conveyance is actually made.22 But the
result of the Massachusetts case would appear to be sustainable, since
the purchase price had not been paid.23 .
These cases would seem to indicate that, despite his lack of a deed,
where the purchase price has been paid, the purchaser at foreclosure
has the important, substantial property rights in the land. However,
there are judicial pronouncements which would seem to lead to the
opposite conclusion. Where property burned after the foreclosure sale
but before the delivery of a deed to the purchaser, it was held that
there had been no "change of title" in the grantor of a deed of trust
within the terms of an insurance policy so as to preclude him from
recovering the insurance on the property.2 4 This conclusion was based
on the fact that no deed was executed to the purchaser, and whether the
purchase price had been paid was ignored. But the fact that as be-
tween the grantor and the insurance company there had been no change
of title in the grantor does not necessarily mean that as between the
grantor and the purchaser "title" had not changed, 25 especially in view
of the leniency of courts in interpreting "change of title" clauses in
insurance contracts. Other courts ostensibly require the purchaser at
foreclosure to have a deed in order to enforce his rights. Yet they
obviate the "inconvenience" 2 6 of this rule by adopting the fiction that
the deed when executed relates back to the time of the foreclosure sale
in order to preclude the intervention of other rights.2 7 By this con-
struction, it would seem that the deed in the principal case might have
"But in Clason v. Corley, 7 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 447 (1852), the purchaser was
refused the rents and profits during the time intervening between the date decreed
for the execution of a deed and the date when the deed was actually executed,
although he made a tender on the date decreed. The court said: "He should have
followed up his tender by a motion . . . to pay his money into court.. .. " Cf.
Mitchell v. Bartlett, 52 Barb. 319 (N. Y. 1868). See Whipple v. Farrar, 3
Mich. 436, 447 (1855).
"But see note 17, supra.
24 Patten v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 223 Mo. App. 1070, 25 S. W.(2d) 1075 (1930).
" CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1930) 64; DICKINSON, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 137. See also Fuller, supra note 11, at 900.
"Fiction is a familiar means for obviating the "inconvenience" of a particular
rule of law. 3 BL. Coieis. * 43; Mitchell, The Fictions of the Law: Have They.
Proved Useful or Detrimental to Its Growth? (1893) 7 HARV. L. REv. 249, 253;
Fuller, supra note 11, at 514.
2, See cases cited infra note 28. This fiction is more often applied to cut outintervening rights between the time of sale and the execution of'a deed to the
purchaser where foreclosure is by decree. 3 JoNEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)§2122. See also ARNOLD & JAMES, CASES ON TRIALS, JUDGMENTS AND APPEALS(1936) 546, n. 9; FREEMiAN, EXECUTIONS (1880) §333.
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satisfied the requirements of the statute, though executed five years
after the sale.28
From the review of the cases, it would seem that a deed to the
purchaser is not an inexorable requirement for the enforcement of
substantive rights. Why, then, is the delivery of a deed to the pur-
chaser made the determining factor in the principal case? It would
seem that the deciding factor should be whether the purchase price had
been paid within the statutory period. When the purchase price was
paid does not clearly appear in the instant case, as it is dismissed as
being irrelevant.2 9 If the purchase price were paid within the prescribed
period, all substantial equities would appear to be in the purchaser,
and only a bare legal title-withheld from the purchaser by the mere
formality of a conveyance-in the grantor.80 It clearly appears in the
instant case, moreover, that the controversy is between the immediate
parties to the foreclosure proceedings, since the plantiff is in privity
with the purchaser, and no repugnant rights could have intervened.3'
For this reason, retroactive operation was given to a deed executed
over eighteen years after the sale in order to cut off the equity of re-
demption of a mortgagor 32 and, in another case, to allow the purchaser
to eject an heir of the mortgagor still in possession many years after
the sale.33 Likewise, for this reason, a purchaser was allowed to main-
tain a suit tb quiet title, though apparently no deed was executed to
him. 3 4  It is submitted, therefore, that where the controversy is be-
tween the immediate parties or their privies and the purchase price
has been paid, foreclosure should be considered complete within the
terms of the statute limiting the time for the exercise of a power of
sale.35
The reasoning- of the court in the principal case in requiring that
8 Cf. Bellenger v. Whitt, 208 Ala. 655, 95 So. 10 (1923) ; Demarest v. Wyn-
koop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129 (N. Y. 1817).
"See Spain v. Hines, 214'N. C. 432, 433, 200 S. E. 25, 27 (1938). A fair
inference would appear to be that the purchase price was credited to the debt at
foreclosure, since the cestui was the purchaser, and that the plaintiff here, claim-
ing through the purchaser, paid fifty dollars down and executed his note for the
balance. Record p. 7, Spain v. Hines, 214 N. C. 432, 200 S. E. 25 (1938).
" See Jennings v. Shannon, 200 N. C. 1, 3, 156 S. E. 89, 90 (1930). Quacre,
as to the equities of the situation where the purchase price has only been crcditcd
to the debt? Where the purchaser has executed a note for the purchase price?
Where the purchaser has paid only part of the purchase'price?
3 See Bennett v. Morrison. 78 Colo. 464, 467, 242 Pac. 636, 637 (1925).
" Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129 (N. Y. 1817).
" Bellenger v. Whitt, 208 Ala. 655, 95 So. 10 (1923).
" Bennett v. Morrison, 78 Colo. 464, 242 Pac. 636 (1925).
" A problem somewhat analogous to that in the principal case arises in con-
nection with the determination of when the Statute of Limitations begins to run
on the right to redeem after foreclosure where such is allowed by statute. The
courts are divided as to whether it begins running at the time of th auction sale,
at the time of the payment of the purchase price, or at the time of the delivery of
a deed to the purchaser. For collection of cases, see note (1936) 101 A. L. R.
1348.
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the grantor be divested of'complete title, both legal and equitable, and
that all interest be vested in the purchaser, might be further tested by
its application to the case where a mortgagee purchases at his own
sale. In North Carolina, the mortgagor has a right to avoid the sale.
3 6
This right is an equitable interest37 remaining in the mortgagor. Thus
the foreclosure would never be complete and would eventually become
barred.
38
OscAR LEAK TYREE.
Torts-Negligence-Common Carriers-Degree of Care
Owed Passengers.
Plaintiff was injured when the taxicab in which she was riding col-
lided with an automobile. She sued the cab company, and the judge
in the county court charged the jury as follows: "The court further
instructs you that a common carrier is held to exercise the greatest
practicable care, the highest degree of prudence, and the utmost human
skill and foresight which has been demonstrated by experience to be
practicable. . . ." On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff the
superior court granted a new trial. This was affirmed by the North
Carolina Supreme Court because the above charge required too high a
degree of care.' In the course of the opinion the court approved the
following test ". . . as far as human care and foresight can go he (the
carrier) must provide for their safe conveyance . . ." qualifying it
only by saying that the carrier was not bound to employ every devise
which the ingenuity of man could provide.2  It seems that the language
approved would require, if anything, an even higher degree of care than
would the phrases employed by the county court.
A large majority of jurisdictions regard taxi companies as common
carriers of passengers and, consequently, require them to exercise the
high degree of care usually exacted from such carriers.3 Regardless
"Whitehead v. Hellen, 76 N. C. 99 (1877) ; Joyner v. Farmer, 78 N. C. 196(1878); Whitehead v. Whitehurst, 108 N. C. 458, 13 S. E. 166 (1891); Austin
v. Stewart, 126 N. C. 525, 36 S. E. 37 (1900).
" See Joyner v. Farmer, 78 N. C. 196, 198 (1878).
31 It has been held in other jurisdictions that no deed is necessary to the vesting
of title in the mortgagee where he purchases at his own sale, since the effect of
the deed is to give him nothing more than he already had, and the power is deemed
to be -fully executed. Monroe v. Stevens, 80 Ky. 155 (1882) ; Jackson v. Colden,
4 Cow. 266 (N. Y. 1822) ; see Jackson v. Tribble, 156 Ala. 480, 489, 47 So. 310,
313 (1908); Ritter v. Mosely, 226 Ala. 648, 652, 148 So. 143, 147 (1933); 3
JONEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §2435. Contra: Pilok v. Bernarski, 230 Mass.
56, 119 N. E. 360 (1918).
'Perry v. Sykes, 215 N. C. 39, 200 S. E. 923 (1939).
2 Id. at 42, 200 S. E. at 925.
' Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 241 U. S. 252, 36 Sup.
Ct. 583, 60 L. ed. 984 (1916); Lindsay v. Anniston, 104 Ala. 257, 16 So. 545
(1894) ; Bezera v. Associated Oil Co., 117 Cal. App. 139, 3 P. (2d) 622 (1931) ;
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of whether taxis are so classified, the fact that they transport large
numbers of people over public highways which grow more dangerous
daily might well dictate a requirement that they exercise as high a de-
gree of care as that exacted from other common carriers, which are
often engaged in less hazardous means of transportation.
Although courts have used different words to set forth the degree
of care wlfich common carriers owe to their passengers, 4 in most in-
stances these various phrases describe degrees of care which are sub-
stantially the same.5 A large majority of the cases demand of the com-
mon carrier a very high degree of care.6 Some of the courts which
adhere to the majority view say the carrier is responsible for the slight-
est negligence,7 while other opinions require the exercise of the highest
degree of care practicable under the circumstances.8 Some of the opin-
ions which require the exercise of a high degree of care say that they
do so because the slightest negligence is likely to cause serious damage.,
Other courts which adhere to the majority view seem to be actuated by
a desire to protect the passenger, who has almost no means of guarding
against the carrier's negligence. 10  A few courts, apparently unmoved
by the above considerations, hold that common carriers fulfill their
Reity v. Yellow Cab Co., 248 Ill. App. 287 (1928); Shelton Taxi Co. v. Bowl-
ing, 244 Ky. 817, 51 S. W. (2d) 468 (1932); Guininan v. Checker Taxi Co.,
289 Mass. 295. 194 N. E. 100 (1935); Durfey v. Milligan, 265 Mich. 97, 251
N. W. 356 (1934); Van Hoefen v. Columbia Taxicab Co., 179 Mo. App. 591,
162 S. W. 694 (1913) ; Ramsdell v. Frederick, 132 Ore. 161, 285 Pac. 219 (1930);
Hughes v. Pittsburgh Transportation Co., 300 Pa. 474, 150 Atl. 152 (1930);
Hogan v. Miller, 156 Va. 166, 157 S. E. 540 (1931); Scales v. Boynton Cab
Co., 198 Wis. 293, 223 N. W. 836 (1929).
'HuTcHINsoN, LAW OF CARRIERS (1st ed. 1882) §501.
Ibid.8 Henson v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 68 F. (2d) 144 (C. C. A. 6th,
1933) ; Alabama Power Co. v. Maddox, 227 Ala. 628, 151 So. 575 (1934); Bezera
v. Associated Oil Co., 117 Cal. App. 139, 3 P. (2d) 622 (1931); Briganti v.
Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316, 175 Atl. 679 (1935); Hauser v. Chicago, R. I.
& P. Ry., 205 Iowa 940, 219 N. W. 60 (1928); Peak v. Louisville & N. R.R.,
221 Ky. 97, 297 S. W. 1107 (1927); Shelton Taxi Co. v. Bowling, 244 Ky. 817,
51 S. W. (2d) 468 (1931); Guininan v. Checker Taxi Co., 289 Mass. 295, 194
N. E. 100 (1935); Durfey v. Milligan, 265 Mich. 97, 251 N. W. 356 (1934);
Ramsdell v. Frederick, 132 Ore. 161, 285 Pac. 219 (1930) ; Hughes v. Pittsburgh
Trans. Co., 300 Pa. 474, 150 Atl. 153 (1930); Hogan v. Miller, 156 Va. 166,
157 S. E. 540 (1931); Scales v. Boynton Cab Co., 198 Wis. 293, 223 N. W.
836 (1929).
7Farish & Co. v. Reigle, 11 Grat. 697 (Va. 1854); McKeon v. Chicago, M.
& St P. Ry., 94 Wis. 477, 69 N. W. 175 (1896).
' Shelton Taxi Co. v. Bowling, 244 Ky. 817, 51 S. W. (2d) 468 (1932);
Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metc. 1 (Mass. 1845) ; Hadley v. Cross, 34 Vt. 586 (1861) ;
Scales v. Boynt6n Cab Co., 198 Wis. 293, 223 N. W. 836 (1929).
'See Philadelphia & R. R. R. v. Derby, 14 How. 468, 486, 14 L. ed. 502,
509 (U. S. 1852); Bruswitz v. Netherlands Am. Steam Nay. Co., 64 Hun 262,
19 N. Y. Supp. 75 (Sup. Ct. 1892); HurrcHINSON, LAW OF CARRIERS (1st ed.
1882) 406.
"0 See Colorado & S. Ry. v. McGeorge, 46 Colo. 15, 23, 102 Pac. 747, 748
(1909); Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Mete. 1, 9 (Mass. 1845); Jacobus v. Railroad, 20
Minn. 110, 113 (1873).
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duty to passengers by exercising due care under the circumstances.'1
In view of the fact that the circumstances would have to be considered
in both cases the minority rule would seem to be more favorable to
carriers than that adhered to by the majority. Since there seems to be
no implied warranty to transport safely,' 2 the only remedy available
to an injured passenger is a suit in tort, which is always available to
him regardless of the contract with the carrier, since no one is allowed
to contract against his own negligence. 13
The liability of common carriers of passengers must not be confused
with that of common carriers of goods.' 4 The latter, at common law
in a large majority of the states, including North Carolina, are liable
as insurers, that is, liable regardless of care exercised.' 5 There are
some well recognized exceptions to the above liability. The exceptions
include injury, loss, or destruction resulting from acts of God, actions
of public enemies,16 inherent defect in the goods, or negligence of the
shipper.17  However, most of the jurisdictions, including North Car-
olina, now permit the carrier to get around this common law rule by
providing in the contract of shipment that it shall not be liable as in-
"" Pomroy v. Bangor & A. R R, 102 Me. 497, 67 At. 561 (1907) ; Thayer
v. Old Colony St. Ry. 214 Mass. 234, 101 N. E. 368 (1913).1 2 ANGELL, LAW OF CARRIERS (5th ed. 1877) 533; HUTcHINSON, LAW OF
CARRIERS (1st ed. 1882) §504.
" New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, 12 L. ed.
465 (U. S. 1848); GODDARD, LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS (2d ed. 1928) 229.
"
4In Hollings~orth v. Skelding, 142 N. C. 246, 247, 55 S. E. 212 (1906)
the charge of the lower court read as follows: "Carriers of passengers are in-
surers as to their passengers, subject to a few reasonable exceptions. They are
he!d to exercise the greatest practicable care, the highest degree of prudence,
and the utmost human skill and foresight which has 'been demonstrated by ex-
perience to be practicable .... The exceptions are the act of God and the
public enemy. If these, that is, the act of God or of the public enemy, be the
proximate cause of the injury and without any neglect on the part of the carrier
the carrier is not liable." The court, on page 248 of the official report, in re-
ferring to the above charge said, "The rule laid down by the late Chief Justice
applies to the transportation of freight and all classes of inanimate objects only."
This charge obviously confused and fused the rules governing carriers of pas-
sengers and those applicable to carriers of freight and did not set out either
rule correctly.
" See note 17, infra.
" This term is used to include those waging war against the sovereign and
not criminals.
" See American Ry. Express Co. v. Fegenbush, 107 Fla. 145, 148, 144 So.
320, 321 (1932); S. Valentine & Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 220 Ill. App.
188, 193 (1920); Hall v. Cumberland Pipe Line Co., 193 Ky. 728, 732, 237 S.
W. 405, 408 (1918) ; Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Yazoo & M. V. RR., 174 La.
762, 767, 141 So. 453, 455 (1932); Warren v. Portland Terminal Co., 121 Me.
157, 116 Atl. 411, 412 (1922); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry., 193 Mo. App. 572, 187 S. W. 149, 151 (1916); Perry v. Seaboard A. L.
R.R., 171 N. C. 158, 161, 88 S. E. 156, 158 (1916); Morris v. American Ry.
Express Co., 183 N. C. 144, 148, 110 S. E. 855, 857 (1922); Haglin-Stahr So.
v. Montpelier & W. R. R.R., 92 Vt. 258, 261, 102 Atl. 940, 941 (1918); Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry. v. Temberlake, Currie & Co., 147 Va. 304, 309, 137 S. E. 507,
508 (1925).
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surer.'8 The carrier is still under a duty to use due care, no one being
allowed to contract against his own negligence. 19
As regards common carriers of passengers the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has used various phrases to describe the degree of care
which must be exercised. In Wallace v. Western North Carolina
R. R. 20 the court said by way of dictum, "... . it is the duty of a com-
pany carrying passengers on such a train [a mixed freight and pas-
senger train] to exercise every reasonable care and take every reason-
able precaution [these and all following italics are ours] . . . which
appliances for that mode of travel will admit of. . . ." Again in Riggs
v. Norfolk & Southern R. R.21 we find the court using the identical
language set out above. Also in Usury v. Watkins22 there is this sim-
ilar language, "In taking passage on a freight train a passenger assumes
the usual risks incident to traveling on such trains, when managed by
prudent and competent men in a careful manner." It seems that the
above language would lead a jury to believe that a common carrier
owes its passengers a duty to use only reasonable care. However, note
the language used in the following cases: The court held in Suttle v.
Southern Ry.23 that "... where a person has been received as a passenger
on one of these mixed trains ... he is entitled to the highest degree of
care and diligence of which such trains are susceptible." Again, in
Kearney v. Seaboard Air Line R. R.2 4 the court held that it was the
duty of a common carrier of passengers to exercise ". . . the highest
degree of care practicable." In another case, Briggs v. Durham Trac-
tion Co.,25 the court described the care owed by a common carrier to
its passengers as, ". . . a high degree of care, skill and diligence in
operating its cars as far as is consistent with the practicable operation
of its business . . . but it is liable only for negligence and is not an
insurer." These cases require the carrier to exercise a much higher
"
8Barron v. Mobile & 0. R.R., 2 Ala. App. 555, 56 So. 862 (1911); St.
Louis-San Franscisco Ry. v. Watts, 168 Ark. 804, 271 S. W. 464 (1925); Mc-
Intosh v. Oregon R.R. & Nay. Co., 17 Idaho 100, 105 Pac. 66 (1909) ; Donchian
v. Brink's Chicago City Express Co., 217 Ill. App. 124 (1920); Young v. Maine
Cent. R.R., 113 Me. 113, 93 Atl. 48 (1915); Murphy v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
99 Minn. 230, 108 N. W. 1070 (1906); Lee v. Raleigh & Gaston R.R., 72 N. C.
236 (1875) ; Hornthal v. Roanoke, N. & B. Steamboat Co., 107 N. C. 76, 11 S. E.
1049 (1890) ; St. Louis & S. F. R.R. v. Akard, 60 Okl. 4, 1.59 Pac. 344 (1916);
Carrol v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 130 Ore. 294, 279 Pac. 961 (1929);
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Manchester Mills, 88 Tenn. 655, 14 S. W. 314 (1890).
"New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 'How. 344, 12 L. ed.
465 (U. S. 1848); Mears v. New York, N. H. & H. Rt.R, 75 Conn. 171, 52
Ati. 610 (1902); Everett v. Norfolk & S. R.R., 138 N. C. 68, 50 S. E. 557
(1905).
20 98 N. C. 494, 498, 4 S. E. 503, 505 (1887).
21188 N. C. 366, 368, 124 S. E. 749, 750 (1924).22152 N. C. 760, 761, 67 S. E. 926, 927 (1910).
23 150 N. C. 668, 671, 67 S. E. 778, 779 (1909).
2- 158 N. C. 521, 527, 74 S. E. 593, 595 (1912).
2r.147 N. C. 389, 392, 61 S. E. 373, 375 (1908).
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degree of care than did those first mentioned, and even these might be
regarded as not entirely consistent since one of them says it must exer-
cise the highest degree of care to which certain trains are susceptible,
a second case limits the highest degree of care by the bounds of prac-
ticability, and a third requires only a high degree of care.
In another case, Cates v. Hall,26 the language used does not seem
to be entirely harmonious with any of the above cases. The court in
this case says. .... .. a carrier is required to use that high degree of
care... which a prudent person would use in view of the nature and
risks of the business.... They (the employees of the company) were,
therefore, charged with a high degree of care in this respect. This
statement imports no infringement on the doctrine which obtains with
us that there are no degrees of care so far as fixing responsibility for
negligence is concerned. This is true on a given state of facts, and in
the same case, the standard is always that care which a prudent man
should use under like circumstances. What such reasonable care is,
however, does vary in different cases and under different conditions,
and the degree of care required of one whose breach of duty is likely
to result in serious harm is greater than when the effect of such a breach
is not near so threatening." This language indicates that the court thinks
that there is no difference between "reasonable care under the circum-
stances" and "a high degree of care". This. seems to be fallacious as
the circumstances would have to be considered whether the carrier is
required to exercise "a high degree of care" or only "reasonable care".
The court in another' case, Marable v. Southern Ry., 27 uses the fol-
lowing quotation which recognizes the fact that the circumstances would
have to be considered is applying the "high degree of care" rule,
"'... the carrier is required to exercise that high degree of care for the
safety of the passenger which a prudent person would use in view of
the nature and risks of the business, or, in general, the highest degree
of care, prudence and foresight which the situation and circumstances
demand." Here the requirement of a high degree of care and the
highest degree of care are blended.
In Pruett v. Southern Ry. 28 the court seems to apply both the "high
degree of care" rule and the "reasonable care" rule. It uses this lan-
guage, "A common carrier ... is required only to exercise proper care
to guard them [its passengers] against injuries which may reasonably
be anticipated." On page five of the official report the court quotes
with approval as follows, "'The rule that it is the duty of a carrier to
use the highest degree of care to protect the passenger from wrong or
26171 N. C. 360, 363, 88 S. E. 524, 525 (1916).
27 142 N. C. 557, 562, 55 S. E. 355, 357 (1906).
28164 N. C. 3, 4, 80 S. E. 65, 66 (1913).
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injury by a fellow-passenger applies only when the carrier has knowl-
edge of the existence of the danger, or of facts and circumstances from
which the danger may be responsibly anticipated.'" This language in-
dicates that a carrier must use the highest degree of care to guard
against known dangers and those of which he reasonably should know
but is only required to use reasonable care to foresee danger. In a
later case, Mills v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.,2 9 the court holds that the
following language, which seems to be squarely contra to that set out
above, correctly describes the duty owed by a common carrier to its
passengers, "Railroad companies ... are held to a high degree of care
in looking after the safety of passengers on their trains . .. and the
company is responsible for actionable wrongs committed upon them by
other passengers or third persons which could have been provided
against or prevented by the utnost vigilance and foresight . . . these
companies are not insurers of the safety of passengers and are not
liable for injuries which in the exercise of such care [this must refer
to the italicized language set out above] their ... employees ... could
not reasonably have prevented."
In view of the fact that jury verdicts may go one way or the other
depending on the language used to describe the degree of care owed by
common carriers to their passengers and the fact that the North Car-
olina court has used so many different phrases to designate this degree
of care it seems that we would secure more uniform verdicts, and have
fewer appeals, if the supreme court would definitely and finally put its
stamp of approval on one consistent group of words which could be
confidently used by trial courts in cases involving this question.
J. NATHANIEL HAMRICK.
Workmen's Compensation-Do Mealtime Injuries Arise Out of
and in the Course of Employment?
D operated a cold drink and sandwich stand in his factory for his
employees. P, an employee, was injured by eating a spoiled sandwich
bought from the refreshment stand. D's motion to dismiss a suit at
common law was denied. On appeal,1 it was held that D was subject
to and operating under the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation
Act; that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment
of P; and, therefore, that the motion to dismiss should have been sus-
tained, as P's remedies against D are limited to those given by the Act.
Injuries suffered by employees during the period allotted to them
for eating--either before, during, or after the actual eating-or while
" 172 N. C: 266, 267, 90 S. E. 221 (1916).
*'Tscheiller v. National Weaving Co., 214 N. C. 449, 199 S. E. 623 (1938).
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refreshing themselves with food or drink during working hours have
been the subject of considerable litigation under workmen's coinpensa-
tion acts. Whether such an injury is compensable depends, under the
usual statute, upon whether the injury was one "arising out of and in
the course of '2 the employment. It is not alone sufficient in order to
award compensation to determine that the injury arose in the course of
the employment, but once this is found it must also be decided that
the injury was caused by the employment.3
The employee usually is allowed compensation for injuries sus-
tained on the employer's premises while eating a lunch which he has
brought from home.4 The courts rely on "employer control" 5- prob-
ably referring to control over the premises by the employer and the
right to regulate their use, though perhaps control over the employee
in that he is subject to immediate recall to work or that he is denied
the right to leave the premises is meant. On fhe other hand, where
'This phrase is common to the great majority of workmen's compensation acts.
Examples are: Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, 1936) §4880; N. Y. WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION LAW §2(7); N. C. CoDz ANN. (Michie, 1935) §8081(i)(f); VA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §1887(2) (c). In some jurisdictions the phrase is
either stated in the alternative or one clause is eliminated. PA. STAT. (Purdon,
1936) tit. 77, §361 ("in the course of") ; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) §42-1-43
("arising out of or in the course of").
' See Mann v. Knitting Co., 90 Conn. 116, 117, 96 Atl. 368 (1916) ; Dietzen
Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 11, 15, 116 N. E. 684, 686 (1917) ; State v. Dis-
trict Court, 138 Minn. 326, 328, 164 N. W. 1012, 1013 (1918) ; Badger Furniture
Co. v. Industrial Comm., 195 Wis. 134, 217 N. W. 734 (1928).
'Humphrey v. Industrial Comm., 285 Ill. 372, 120 N. E. 816 (1918); Haller
v. Lansing, 195 Mich. 753, 162 N. W. 335 (1917) ; Racine Rubber Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm., 165 Wis. 600, 162 N. W. 664 (1917). However, it would seem
absurd to hold the employer liable for an industrial accident where the employee
was poisoned by, or choked upon, his own food while eating. This would be
because the injury would not arise out of the employment, not because the work-
man was not in the course thereof.
'The "employer control" theory, however, is not a reliable basis on which to
allow recovery. Its application is subject to as many objections as the other
general rules laid down by the courts. Some do not refer to any underlying
theory at all, while a great many others merely state in general terms that the
injury was not so far removed from the actual work as to take the employee out
of the c6urse of his employment. Examples of the phraseology -of a few courts
attempting to define the degree of relationship between the injury and the em-
ployment necessary to bring the employee within the remedial scope of the act
are: Mann v. Knitting Co., 90 Conn. 116, 96 Atl. 368 (1916) (there must be a
causal connection); Larke v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 Conn. 303,
"97 Atl. 320 (1916) (the injury must occur within the period of employment, at
a place where the workman may reasonably be, reasonably fulfilling duties of
the employment, or doing something incidental to it); Wasmuth-Endicott Co.
v. Karst, 77 Ind. App. 279, 133 N. E. 609 (1922) (the injury must be incidental
to the service) ; Haller v. Lansing, 195 Mich. 753, 162 N. W. 335 (1917) (work-
man must -be doing a reasonable and natural thing under existing conditions);
Ames v. Lake Independence Lumber Co., 226 Mich. 83, 197 N. W. 499 (1924)
(injury must result from some special hazard incidental to or arising out of
workman's employment); State v. District Court, 138 Minn. 326, 164 N. W.
1012 (1918) (injury must result from a hazard of the employment or be attrib-
utable to a peculiar liability inherent in the employment) ; Stratton v. Interstate
Fruit Co., 47 S. D. 452, 199 N. W. 117 (1924) (injury must be incident to the
employment).
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the employee goes to forbidden parts of the premises or leaves them
entirely to dine at home or elsewhere he is denied compensation,0 the
courts saying that this activity takes him out of the course of his em-
ployment. Whatever the nature of the control that influences the courts
when the employee has eaten upon the employer's premises, that ele-
ment is lacking when the employee goes home to eat.
Where the employer himself furnishes meals on the premises to
the employees free of charge to the~m it would seem that he is re-
sponsible for injuries that occur either going to or from, or suffered at
the meal, or those occasioned by the food itself.7 Here, as in the
case where the employee brings his own lunch, there is the element
of "employer control". If the meals are furnished on a permanent
basis there is the additional reason that they are but a means of com-
pensation to the employee in that his actual salary is probably lower
than it otherwise would have been.8 Thus, going to meals is collecting
wages, which is a part of the employment.9 Even where the employee
purchases his meal from the employer on the latter's premises there
remains the element of "employer control" which seems sufficient to
justify an award of compensation. Injuries caused by impurities in
drinking water furnished employees upon the premises are generally
held to be compensable.' 0 Here too there is the element of "employer
control"-not only over the premises but also over the employee who
ceases work only momentarily. Further, because of the normal bodily
requirement of drinking water the employee by reason of his employ-
ment is exposed to the risk involved in satisfying this need.
When it is necessary for an employee to leave the premises where
he is working in order to avail himself of food and drink furnished
by the employer, complicating factors are present. The further .re-
moved the employee from the scene of his actual labor, the more diffi-
cult it is to conceive the risk of injury to be incident to his employ-
' Moore & Scott Iron Works v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 36 Cal. App. 582, 172
Pac. 1114 (1918); Haggard's Case, 234 Mass. 330, 125 N. E. 565 (1920).
Contra: Stratton v. Interstate Fruit Co., 47 S. D. 452, 199 N. W. 117 (1924).TMartin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 197 App. Div. 382, 189 N. Y. Supp. 467
(1st'Dep't 1921). An employee was injured in the elevator while going down-
stairs after eating a free lunch furnished by the employer on the twelfth floor.
The court awarded compensation on the ground that the employer was obligated
to furnish a safe exist from the employment, thereby implying that the employee
was in the course of his employment while eating the free lunch.8 Cf. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 194 Cal. 28, 227
Pac. 168 (1924).
'The implication contained in State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial
Acc. Comm., 194 Cal. 28, 227 Pac. 168 (1924), that the employee who is furnished
with room and board in lieu of wages is simply collecting that compensation when-
ever and wherever using such accommodations is far reaching, but is illustrative
of the liberal attitude of the courts in the interpretation of the compensation acts.
" Wasmuth-Endicott Co. v. Karst, 77 Ind. App. 279, 133 N. E. 609 (1922);
Frankamp v. Fordney Hotel, 222 Mich. 525, 193 N. W. 204 (1923) ; Ames v. Lake
Independence Lumber Co., 226 Mich. 83, 197 N. W. 499 (1924).
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ment. However, the mere fact that he leaves the premises should not
control, as the case of Redford v. Armstrong" illustrates. There an
employee had been injured while leaving a canteen operated by the
employer for the exclusive purpose of selling meals and refreshments
to employees, who were permitted but not required to use it. Compen-
sation was allowed in spite of the fact that in order to reach the can-
teen. which was in another part of the building from that where he
worked, the employee had to go out upon the street and enter through
an outside door. The court considered the fact that the canteen was
controlled by the employer and that it was contemplated that the em-
ployee should use it as an incident to his employment as determinative.
Again, for reasons already discussed, it should be immaterial in this
type of situation whether the employee pays for food or drink as long
as the facilities are open only to employees. But when the employee
patronizes an eating establishment operated by his employer off the
premises where he works, when he must pay for his food, and when
the place is open to the general public, the employee is exposed to no
risk different from that to which the general public is exposed; if he
-is perfectly free to go there or not, it is difficult to see how an injury
suffered there is one arising out of and in the course of his employ-
ment.1 2 Yet if meals are furnished free to an employee at such an
establishment, compensation may be awarded on the theory that the
free meals are but a method of remuneration for his employment,
which occasions the employee's presence.13 Correspondingly, if as a
result of pressure exerted by the employer the employee patronizes
such an establishment through fear of dismissal, although paying for
his meals as would the public, it may be argued that the employee has
assumed risks by reason of his employment and that such an injury
should be compensable.
An injury suffered off the premises at an eating establishment
operated by a third party would not ordinarily be compensable.14 The
situation could be changed, however, if. the employer should pay for
"121 L. T. R. (N. s.) 293 (C. A. 1919).
2 Brown, "Arisinq Out of and in the Course of the Employment" in Work-
mnen's Compensation Laws (1932) 8 Wis. L. REv. 134, 252. It seems that unless
there is some relation between the employer's order and the injury, which would
make it immaterial whether or not others were exposed to the same hazard, the
employee must by reason of his employment -be subjected to some greater degree
of hazard than the general public, when he is in the same place with the public,
before a resulting injury is compensable.
"See note 9, supra.
', Mitchell v. Ball Bros., 97 Ind. App. 642, 186 N. E. 900 (1933) (employer
operated cafeteria on premises, but employee ate at restaurant across the street) ;
Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N. W. 243 (1914); McInerney v. Buffalo &
S. R. Corp., 225 N. Y. 130, 121 N. E. 806 (1919). When the employee starts
from the premises on business of his own, the nexus between employer and
employee is, as a general rule, broken. But cf. Manchester St. Ry. v. Barrett,
265 Fed. 557 (C. C. A. 1st, 1920).
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the meal and require the employee to eat at a particular place. Thus,
in Krause v. Swartwood'5 a secretary was allowed compensation when
injured by the food at a restaurant adjacent to her employer's office,
the employer having paid for her meal and asked that she eat there in
order to be within hearing of his telephone. But in Johnson v. Smith'0
compensation was refused where an employee was injured by the food
in a restaurant in a town to which he had been sent on business. The
employer had paid for the meal but had not chosen the restaurant, the
latter fact affording a possible distinction between the two cases.
It is extremely difficult to solve any of these cases by applying
the "arising out of and in the course of employment" phrase because
it is subject to varied interpretations, and, while it would be judicially
desirable to work out one general governing principle, it has seemed
impossible. The rules governing recovery in mealtime cases do not
appear to be any different from those applied in lightning cases,17
horseplay cases,' 8 going to and from work cases, 19 cases involving in-
juries from company-sponsored athletics, 20 and cases occasioned by in-
juries resulting from acts for the personal comfort or convenience of
the employee,2' if those tests can be satisfactorily determined. The ma-
jority of the courts seldom attempt to lay down any inflexible rule for
the determination of why an accident arises out of and in the course
of the employment, but content themselves with letting their intuition
be their guide. And justly so; many cases deserving relief cannot be
fitted into any very specific rule. But it is evident that a constantly
more liberal interpretation is being given to the compensation acts, both
to give the employee relief and to protect the employer from suits at
common law with their usual large verdicts.
HARRY MCMULLAN, JR.
174 Minn. 147, 218 N. W. 555 (1928).
18263 N. Y. 10, 188 N. E. 140 (1933).
"'Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 81'Colo. 233, 254 Pac. 995 (1927);
Alzina Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm., 309 Ill. 395, 141 N. E. 191 (1923);
notes (1928) 26 MIcH. L. Rv. 307, (1930) 28 Micr. L. RFv. 944.
" Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920);
Industrial Comm. v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N. E. 38 (1921) ; note (1930)
9 N. C. L. REv. 105.
9 Flanagan v. Webster & Webster, 107 Conn. 502, 142 Atl. 201 (1928);
Brown, "Arisinq Out of and in the Course of the Employment" in Workme's
Compensation Laws (1931) 7 Wis. L. REv. 15, 29; (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 125.
"0 Industrial Comm. of Colo. v. Murphey, 102 Colo. 59, 76 P. (2d) 741 (1938);
Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 276 Mich. 24, 267 N. W. 589 (1936); Ryan v. State
Industrial Comm., 128 Okla. 25, 261 Pac. 181 (1927).
2" Compensation was allowed employees injured while engaged in the following
activities: Richards v. Indianapolis Abattoir Co., 92 Conn. 274, 102 Atl. 604
(1917) (seeking warmth or shelter) ; Steel Sales Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 293
Ill. 435, 127 N. E. 698 (1920) (attending calls of nature); Hollenbach Co. v.
Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W. 152 (1918) (washing up); In re Von Ette,
223 Mass. 56, 111 N. E. 696 (1916) (resting) ; Dzikowska v. Superior Steel Co.,
259 Pa. 578. 103 Atl. 351 (1918) (smoking); Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co.,
161 Wis. 370, 154 N. W. 640 (1915) (drinking water).
